Have Questions or Comments?
Leave us some feedback and we'll reply back!

    Your Name (required)

    Your Email (required)

    Phone Number)

    In Reference to

    Your Message


    Kahanism and Vengeance Part 1

    Over the past few weeks, we have discussed R. Meir Kahane’s approach to democracy in his Or Ha-Ra’ayon, in comparison with Rishonim, Acharonim and contemporaries. Continuing this study of his text, we turn to his chapter on revenge (ch. 12). R. Kahane sees revenge as an important tool in repairing the world, something Westerners would certainly find surprising. Classical Jewish ethicists also see revenge very differently.

    I. KAHANIST VIEW OF REVENGE

    R. Kahane believes that exacting revenge is a great mitzvah. “There is nothing greater and more righteous than revenge in its place and time” (p. 119). His argument is theological: When the wicked prosper, God’s providence becomes more hidden. By facilitating divine justice, the avenger increases awareness of God and His. In other words, revenge is a Kiddush Hashem.

    Revenge is a cause for joy, celebrating the divine victory over the wicked (pp. 128, 130). It is a mitzvah that the most righteous Jews strive to fulfill. Admittedly, people often find it difficult to overcome their innate feelings of mercy but those who are able to do so receive ample reward (pp. 132-133). Those who cannot exact God’s revenge ironically display cruelty, even heresy, and deny justice its proper place in the world (pp. 119, 132).

    R. Kahane makes two important distinctions regarding revenge. First, you are forbidden to take revenge on other Jews and only permitted on gentiles. This distinction is important in explaining the Torah’s apparent contradictions regarding revenge, praising it (e.g. Psalms 58:11) but also forbidding it (Lev. 19:18). Revenge against Jews is forbidden but against gentiles is even a mitzvah (pp. 120-121). I hope to discuss in a later study of R. Kahane’s attitude toward gentiles and therefore will refrain from discussing this further here.

    The second distinction is a matter of intent: Revenge out of anger or hatred is unacceptable but based on the desire to increase God’s glory is a mitzvah (pp. 125, 132).

    II. IS REVENGE GOOD?

    The key criticism on this subject that can be filed against R. Kahane is one of emphasis. He seems more enthusiastic about revenge than any prior scholar. Everyone agrees that the wicked should be brought to justice and that accomplishing such a task is worthy of satisfaction. However, R. Kahane seems to relish it, making it a prime objective.

    In comparison, R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol (Midos Ha-Nefesh 2:4) writes: «This trait [of cruelty] is in the soul [of one] who achieves revenge against enemies. It is not that bad when used in this way even though the enlightened person should not fully achieve this trait and should not exact revenge on his enemy with all his ability because this is not a good trait. As it says, ‹Do not rejoice at the fall of your enemy.›» According to R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol, revenge is a necessary evil that the righteous should never fully embrace.

    The Orchos Tzadikim (end of achzarius) warns against taking any revenge by stooping to the level of your enemy: “Beware of revenge that emerges from cruelty. If you wish to take revenge, add good [spiritual] levels and walk in the path of the just. With this, you will exact revenge on your enemies who will be pained by your trait and will mourn over your good reputation and good name. But if you perform reprehensible acts then your enemy will rejoice on your shame and take revenge on you.” The Orchos Tzadikim suggests taking the higher road and exacting revenge by acting better than your enemy.

    According to these classical Mussar texts, revenge emerges from cruelty. Therefore, it should be avoided. In contrast, R. Kahane considers revenger a mitzvah. In one case, R. Kahane is clearly correct. The Torah (Num. 35:19) commands a relative to be a go’el ha-dam, blood avenger, for someone who is murdered. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 45b) says that if someone murdered has no relative to avenge the murder, a beis din has to appoint someone to do it. Based on this, Rav Menachem Mendel Krochmal (Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, no. 111) rules that a community should force a family to avenge a relative’s murder. In the case of murder, revenge is a religious obligation.

    (to be continued…)