26 Oct PIDYON SHEVUYIM FOR SOMEONE GUILTY
P i d y o n i m
Shevuyim means
redeeming a
captive, paying
s o m e o n e ’ s
ransom. It
is among
the highest
priorities of
mitzvos. Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh
De’ah 252:1) is more important
than feeding and clothing the poor.
If we fail to redeem captives, we
risk rampant death and assimilation
of upstanding members of our
community.
Some people think pidyon shevuyim
is a relic of the past, when bandits
controlled key roads and pirates
rules the seas. But the truth is that
kidnapping for ransom purposes
still occurs and insurance companies
sell policies to companies and high
net worth individuals to help in the
case of a ransom demand. Pirates
still operate on the seas, board ships
and take hostages. And, of course,
in recent decades terrorists hijacked
airplanes and took hostages.
I. Exorbitant Ransoms
The Mishnah (Gittin 45a) lists
two rabbinic enactments regarding
kidnappings:
1) Do not pay an exorbitant ransom,
i.e. above the going rate (for reasons
discussed below). We will define
below how to determine a reasonable
ransom.
2) Do not help captives escape
(because that will endanger those who
fail to escape and future captives).
The Gemara asks whether the
enactment against paying exorbitant
is because of:
A) doing so will place an undue
communal burden, or
B) paying too much ransom will
encourage more kidnappings.
The Gemara says that the practical
difference between reasons A and B
is whether an individual — a family
member or friend — can volunteer
to pay the exorbitant ransom. If the
enactment is to prevent a communal
burden, this should be allowed
because the burden is carried by
individuals and not the community.
If the enactment is so as not to
encourage further abductions, then
even individuals may not volunteer
to pay an exorbitant ransom because
everyone will suffer in the future.
The Gemara does not offer a definitive
conclusion but Rambam (Mishneh
Torah, Hilkhos Matenos Aniyim 8:12)
and Shulchan Arukh (ibid., 4) cite the
second explanation. They rule that
we are not allowed to pay exorbitant
ransoms to avoid encouraging future
kidnappings.
II. Reasonable Ransoms
What is a reasonable ransom and what
is exorbitant? Rav David Ibn Zimra
(Radbaz, 16th cen., Egypt; Responsa
1:4) discusses the custom he saw
when he arrived in Egypt (he was
among those expelled from Spain).
In Egypt, Jews were accustomed to
paying ransoms as much as 5 times
what Muslims would pay. Radbaz
struggles to define the going rate for
ransom in a way that justifies this
practice.
One way to define market rate is to
see for what price someone like the
captive would sell on the slave market
(yes, Jews were traded as slaves in
Africa in those days). Obviously,
today that would not work because
there is no slave market, at least not
out in the open. Even in those days,
Jews paid ransom that was much
higher than the market slave price.
Radbaz suggests looking at the
common ransom paid by all people.
Maybe the average for a man or
woman of that age serves as a
reasonable ransom, allowing for
some variance in the exact amount.
However, that still does not account
for the high ransoms that Jews were
paying in Egypt of his time.
Radbaz offers a number of
unconvincing rationalizations:
perhaps a gentile would pay such
a high ransom if necessary; maybe
we pay an average ransom for the
captive and an additional premium
for the religion (I don’t understand
what this means); maybe the
captives all fall under one of the
exceptions we will discuss shortly.
None of these explanations answer
the question satisfactorily but
Radbaz concludes that he should not
interfere with the ransom practice of
his day.
Tosafos (Gittin 45a s.v. de-lo)
struggle to reconcile all the different
stories in the Talmud about captives
with this enactment not to pay
exorbitant ransoms. In order to
make sense of
the conflicting
n a r r a t i v e s ,
Tosafos list a
few exceptions
to the
enactment:
1) You can pay
any amount to
redeem yourself
or your spouse.
2) You can pay
an exorbitant
ransom for a
Torah scholar or
someone who
shows promise
of growing into
one.
3) During a time of great antiSemitism, such as immediately
following the destruction of the
Temple, you can pay any ransom
because people kidnap Jews with
abandon and will not be encouraged
by paying high ransoms. This
certainly applied to the Holocaust.
4) Later scholars debate whether
you can pay an exorbitant ransom
to save someone from certain death.
(See Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh De’ah
252:4).
III. Guilty Parties
In the course of discussing these
laws, Rav Shlomo Luria (Maharshal,
16th cen., Poland; Yam Shel Shlomo,
Gittin 4:72) says that if someone
is captured because he stole from
gentiles, there is no mitzvah to
redeem him from captivity. Even if
the punishment is disproportionate
to the crime, he knowingly entered
that dangerous situation and does not
merit a communal effort of the highest
priority to pay his ransom.
Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin (17th
cen., Poland; Responsa, no. 15)
discusses the case of a Jewish man
who was caught with a gentile
(Christian) woman. The local gentiles
threatened to kill him but would have
freed him for a ransom. Maharam
Lublin says emphatically that there
is a mitzvah to redeem him from this
captivity even though he brought it on
himself through sinful behavior.
Radbaz (Mishneh Torah, Matenos
Aniyim 8:13) says that he was asked
whether there is a mitzvah to redeem
someone held captive for stealing
from gentiles. He says that this does,
indeed, constitute the mitzvah of
pidyon shevuyim. This would also be
the case of someone is held captive
for stealing from Jews.
Ultimately, whether there is a mitzvah
of pidyon shevuyim for someone
guilty boils down to a debate between
Maharshal on one side and Radbaz
and Maharam Lublin on the other. In
my survey of authorities of the last
century, I have found that they seem
to follow Maharshal. These include
Rav Malkiel
Ta n n e n b a u m ,
Divrei Malkiel
5:60; Rav
Shmuel Wosner,
Shevet HaLevi 5:135; Rav
Shlomo Zalman
A u e r b a c h ,
as quoted in
Ve-Alehu Lo
Yibol (2:113);
Rav Yitzchak
Z i l b e r s t e i n ,
C h a s h u k e i
Chemed, Gittin
47a.