29 Aug DO I HAVE TO LISTEN TO A RABBI?

When you ask a rabbi
a question, you are
committing yourself to
following his answer.
But what if you didn’t
ask? Do you still have
to follow his ruling? Put
in a different way, and a
bit more broadly, should a rabbinic authority
insist that his ruling be followed? Of course,
we live in a free society and technically no
one is required to follow anything but the
law of the land. But from the perspective
of religious propriety, should a rabbi advise
someone to follow the rabbi’s halachic ruling
or can he leave the person, or even advise
him, to follow any legitimate halachic view?
I. Can I Be Stricter?
Three apparently contradictory Talmudic
passages come to mind, although there are
probably many more that are relevant.
1) There is a debate whether you are
allowed to carry an extinguished candle
on Shabbos. When R. Abahu was in the
community of R. Yehoshua Ben Levi, who
permitted, R. Abahu carried such a candle.
When he was in the community of R.
Yochanan, who forbade it, he did not carry
an extinguished candle (Shabbos 46a). The

Gemara asks that if R. Abahu personally
held that it was permissible, why would
he refrain from carrying it? And if he held
that it was forbidden, how could he commit
what in his view constitutes a transgression?
The Gemara answers that R. Abahu held
that it is permissible but out of respect for
R. Yochanan, he acted strictly while in his
community.
From this passage, we see that you should
act strictly like the local authority out of
respect. However, if he is lenient, you cannot
disregard your own strict view.
2) There is a debate whether cooked liver
is permitted. Rav Bar Sheva went to Rav
Nachman’s house and they were served
cooked liver. Rav Bar Sheva refrained from
eating it and seemed to hide the fact but
someone noticed and told Rav Nachman that
Rav Bar Sheva was not eating the cooked
liver. Rav Nachman told them to force feed
it to him (Chullin 111a).
In contrast to the prior case, in which
someone who is strict cannot be expected to
act leniently out of respect, Rav Nachman
demanded that Rav Bar Sheva eat the food.
This is despite the fact that there was an
existing debate on the subject and Rav Bar
Sheva followed a legitimate strict view.

II. You Must Be Stricter
3) R. Mari Bar Rachel had pillows sitting
outside on Shabbos and he wanted to move
them so they would not sustain damage
from the sun. He asked Rava whether he
is allowed to move the pillows (Shabbos
124b). Rava said he is allowed and R. Mari
objected that he has other pillows so he
does not need these. Rava said that he might
receive guests and need additional pillows
but R. Mari responded that he has more than
enough for guests. Rava realized that R.
Mari follows a strict opinion that does not
allow moving even permitted objects, unless
they are needed for use or their place is
needed. Therefore, Rava said that everyone
else is allowed to move the pillows but not
R. Mari Bar Rachel.[1]
In this passage, R. Mari Bar Rachel followed
a legitimate strict view and Rava told him
he had to continue following it. Rava had
R. Mari act like the first Gemara assumes
R. Yochanan would act, not abandoning his
strict view just because the local authority
rules leniently. This is in stark contrast to
Rav Nachman, who did not allow Rav Bar
Sheva to follow his legitimate strict view.
Why the difference? We could attribute
this to differing personalities but that is
not particularly compelling nor does it
engage the analytical possibilities.
Rav Ya’akov Emden (18th cen.,
Germany) addresses these contradictions
in a gloss to Shabbos (124b, s.v. le-kuli
alma) that was published from manuscript
in the Moznaim/Vagshal Talmud (it does
not appear in other editions). Rav Emden
distinguishes between a student and other
people. Anyone in general who follows
a specific view may not act leniently
against that view, even out of respect
for the local rabbi (unless there is some
technical reason to allow leniency).
However, a student is bound to follow
his teacher’s views and therefore may not
act strictly, particularly in the teacher’s
presence. Rav Nachman was justifiably
upset when his student, Rav Bar Sheva,
acted strictly against his teacher’s
leniency in that teacher’s home. That

is not only improper halachic decision-
making but also highly disrespectful.

The other two cases above reflect how
someone should act regarding a rabbi
who is not your teacher. You should not
abandon your views, or the strict views
you were taught, merely because you are
in the community of someone who rules
leniently.
III. Eruvin and Students
While not quoting the above sources,
Rav Hershel Schachter (cont., US) says
something similar regarding a new rabbi

in a community (Be-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, ch. 12).
If a rabbi is appointed to lead a community
that has an eruv built by a previous rabbi
based on a lenient view with which the new
rabbi disagrees (or his teachers disagree),
the new rabbi does not have to change
the eruv immediately. The community
members are following a legitimate lenient
view. However, after the rabbi serves
the community for some time and offers
guidance that people follow, the community
members become his students and must
follow his strict views. The rabbi must fix
the eruv or people must stop using it. And
after even more time, the eruv will come
to be known as this new rabbi’s eruv so he
definitely has to fix it.
If I remember correctly, and it’s been many
years since this happened so I may have some
details wrong, in the 1980’s a rumor spread
in Teaneck that Rav Schachter believed the
(north) Teaneck eruv was invalid. From
what I understand, Rav Schachter issued
a letter clarifying his view that he follows
a strict ruling (of the Avnei Nezer, Orach
Chaim 290) that the walls of an eruv cannot
cross over private property. Since that eruv
did so, Rav Schachter’s students should not
carry in the eruv until it is fixed (which it
was). He added that anyone who is not his
student is not bound by his strict ruling,
and indeed many authorities are lenient on
that issue. I believe that despite my hazy
memory of the events, this follows Rav
Schachter’s reasoning in his article above
and Rav Ya’akov Emden’s explanation of
the different Talmudic passages above.