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    DEATH PENALTY

    Even those with only
    a passing knowledge
    of the Five Books of
    Moses recognize the
    death penalty applied
    to various sins. The Oral
    Torah, committed to writing centuries later,
    explains the procedural limitations to these
    penalties. However there is another Jewish
    penalty that was administered in one way
    or another into the early Modern Era.
    I. Talmudic Punishments
    The Talmud (Sanhedrin 58b) says that
    someone who threatens another by lifting
    his hand — even without actually hitting
    him — has committed a terrible sin. Rav
    Huna even had someone’s hand cut off for
    doing this. This is quite astonishing because
    no such punishment is mentioned in the
    Bible or elsewhere in rabbinic literature.
    On what authority did Rav Huna punish
    that criminal so harshly?
    Earlier, the Talmud (Sanhedrin 52b) says

    that Rav Chama Bar Tuviah burned with
    branches a cohen’s adulterous daughter.
    Rav Yosef says that Rav Chama Bar Tuviah
    made two mistakes. First, the official form
    of execution by burning consists of feeding
    the criminal burning metal, to consume
    only the internal organs. He mistakenly
    burned the entire person. Second, courts
    are only authorized to execute criminals
    when the Temple is intact. In other words,
    the Talmud’s final word is to denounce this
    execution.
    However, Rav Shlomo Luria (Maharshal,
    16th cen., Poland; Chochmas Shlomo, ad
    loc.) daringly disagrees with Rav Yosef’s
    denunciation of this execution. Maharshal
    does not but could have quoted Sanhedrin
    46a where the story is told of someone who,
    during the era of Greek control of Israel,
    rode a horse on Shabbos and was executed
    by the religious court. This overly severe
    punishment for the violation of a rabbinic
    edict is justified by the general rule that a

    court can punish and even execute someone
    in order to maintain religious order (we will
    discuss the parameters below).
    If so, asks Maharshal, perhaps Rav Chama
    Bar Tuviah’s two mistakes answer each
    other. He was fully aware that he lacked
    authorization to administer a biblical
    execution because the Temple was no longer
    functioning. Therefore, he administered a
    different execution — an actual burning
    rather than an internal burning.
    II. Early Modern Punishment
    Rav Meir of Lublin (Maharam Lublin,
    early 17th cen., Poland; Responsa, no. 138)
    was asked about a Jewish murderer who
    was being held by Polish authorities. The
    local rabbi asked whether he is allowed to
    recommend execution, a recommendation
    that would certainly be implemented.
    Maharam Lublin describes how Medieval
    authorities (e.g. Rashba and Rivash) had
    permitted execution based on the above
    Talmudic passages. Without quoting
    Maharshal, Maharam Lublin responds
    to his criticism of Rav Yosef. Rav Chama
    Bar Tuviah was, indeed, mistaken in
    executing the woman through burning.
    He should have used a completely
    different method of execution. From the
    fact that he used burning, we see that he

    was attempting to implement the Torah-
    based form of execution, about which he

    was doubly mistaken.
    Rav Yosef Karo (16th cen., Israel;
    Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat
    2:1) writes that a religious court has
    permission to punish and even execute
    above the letter of the law when the court
    sees that people are promiscuous sinners.
    Rav Yehoshua Falk Katz (early 17th cen,
    Poland; Sema 2:3) adds that a court can
    punish in this way an individual of that
    nature, even if the criminal behavior
    is not widespread. However, Pischei
    Teshuvah (Choshen Mishpat 2:1) quotes
    Rav Yonasan Eybeschutz (18th cen.,
    Germany; Urim 2:1) who disagrees. He
    argues that extra-legal execution serves
    only as an extreme measure for public
    welfare when lawlessness already exists.
    If people generally obey the law, the
    court has no right to take such an extreme
    measure on individuals. Execution and
    other overly strict punishments are
    intended as a deterrent for future sin,
    not as a punishment for past sin.

    III. Individual Criminals
    Rav Ya’akov Reischer (early 18th cen.,
    Germany; Shevus Ya’akov 1:130) was
    asked about a growing trend of grooms
    falsely claiming to have found their brides
    not being virgins, in order to obtain larger
    dowries from their fathers-in-law. A rabbi
    who caught someone doing this asked Rav
    Reischer whether he may flog and fine

    the groom as a deterrent to future would-
    be false claimants. Aside from the theft

    involved, the humiliation of a young bride
    by her new husband is detestable. While
    the actions of a few unsavory individuals
    do not constitute widespread lawlessness,
    the possibility that the trend may grow was
    troubling.
    Rav Reischer quotes Maharam Lublin
    above, who says that a court may punish
    extra-legally even if only an individual
    flagrantly violates a law, similar to Rav Falk
    Katz. If a court carefully and cautiously
    evaluates the sociological situation and
    concludes that they must set an example
    to prevent societal decline, they may do
    so. Even if there is no current emergency,
    they may take action to prevent one from
    developing. No judges should render this
    decision lightly but neither may they
    abdicate their responsibility to maintain
    law and order.
    In Maharam Lublin’s case of a blatant
    murderer, he ruled that in theory the local
    rabbi may recommend execution but he —
    Maharam Lublin — was too distant to reach
    an informed conclusion. Rav Reischer
    similarly ruled that the local court may
    punish harshly a falsely accusing groom
    but must do so after careful deliberation
    and taking into account the possibility that
    a harsh punishment may push the criminal
    to leave the fold entirely. According to these
    authorities, when — and if — execution
    and other harsh punishments serve as
    effective deterrents, they may be imposed
    even today, albeit within governmental
    regulations. But if they do not effectively
    deter crime, then these punishments have
    no place in our society.