29 Apr AI, GOLEM AND NOT-SO-SILLY QUESTIONS

I. Golem and
Minyan
We are witnessing a
major transformation
of information and
technology with the
growth of artificial
intelligence (AI). To my frustration, much of
the Jewish discourse on AI begins—and often
ends—with the halachic status of a golem. A
golem is an often-discussed literary creature
that is made by a pious Torah scholar through
kabbalistic means. In the late seventeenth
century, Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (known as the
Chacham Tzvi) asked whether a golem can
be counted for a minyan, a prayer quorum
(Responsa Chacham Tzvi, no. 93). His
analysis and the subsequent literature is often
cited in the context of contemporary AI.
While this analogy may seem strained—after
all, a golem is a physical construct created
by mystical means, while AI is code—it
points to something deeper: our tradition’s
attempt to grapple with beings that fall
outside standard halachic categories. And
this, I believe, is a much more serious and
necessary conversation.
Perhaps my original frustration lies with
Chacham Tzvi’s initial question. Of course,
a golem cannot count for a minyan. It isn’t

a person and certainly isn’t a Jew. What is
the question? While his conclusion is that
you cannot count a golem for a minyan, his
reasoning is hardly rigorous. On the one
hand, since someone who raises an orphan
is considered as if he birthed him (Sanhedrin
19b). Since the actions and good deeds of the
righteous are like their children (Rashi, Gen.
3:9). Therefore, a golem that was created
and raised by a righteous person is like the
person’s child. On the other hand, the Gemara
(Sanhedrin 65b) says that R. Zeira created a
golem and then destroyed it. From the fact
that R. Zeira could “kill” a golem, we see
that it is not truly alive (Responsa Chacham
Tzvi, no. 93). All of these arguments emerge
from an analysis of aggadic passages that
need not be taken literally. This seems like an
interesting intellectual exercise rather than a
careful, serious halachic analysis.
Later scholars take this further. If a golem
slaughters an animal, is it kosher (Darkei
Teshuvah 7:11)? Does a dead golem’s corpse
convery ritual impurity (Sidrei Taharos,
Ohalos 5a)? May one eat a golem animal’s
meat together with milk (Malbim, Gen.
18:8)? If a golem finds a lost object, may
he keep it or must he give it to his creator
(Chashukei Chemed, Sanhedrin 65b)? As
an intellectual exercise, this is all very
stimulating. Indeed, an important part of

the Talmudic method consists of
exploring unusual, extreme cases
to test the boundaries of the law.
But are we supposed to take all this
discussion of a golem seriously?
No one alive has ever seen a golem
and none of the arguments in any
direction meet the standards of
normal halachic argumentation.
(These examples are taken from
R. Yosie Levine, Hacham Tsevi
Ashkenazi and the Battleground of
the Early Modern Rabbinate, pp. 188-192,
and R. J. David Bleich, Jewish Law and
Contemporary Issues, pp. 373-382.)
II. Unclassified Beings
The answer, I believe, is that this is
an immensely important conversation
for developing a comprehensive Torah
worldview. The question at hand is not
what the status may be of a golem or an
AI. The question is much bigger: How do
we live in a world with beings that are not
bound by any ethical framework? Imagine
there was a whole class of beings who fall
into no halachic category. How would we
relate to them? What would we expect of
them? Would we be allowed to lie to them,
steal from them and even kill them without
consequence? That seems hard to accept.
Would the laws of forbidden relationships,
or even assault, apply to their females?
Presumably they would apply because
any answer to the contrary would lead to
absurd results. The question, then, is why.
What category applies to such unnatural
beings? The stakes are high because at the
rate that technology seems to be advancing,
this minor curiosity will soon become a
widespread reality.
The midrash says that Yosef told his
father that his brothers were, among other
things, eating from live animals and acting
improperly with girls (Rashi, Gen. 37:2).
Rav Yeshayahu Horowitz (Shelah; 17th
cen., Germany) asks how the brothers
could have acted so improperly and
contrary to Jewish law? He answers that the
animals and the girls were created through
kabbalah but Yosef did not realize that this
was the case. In other words, unnaturally
created beings do not have the same rights
and protections as those naturally born. If
generalized, this opinion on this limited
circumstance would imply that it would be
perfectly moral to assault a life-like female
robot. That seems an unlikely conclusion.
Rav Elchanan Wasserman (20th cen.,
Belarus) quotes earlier sources that say
that in the times of Mashiach, there
will be a resurrection of the deceased
righteous which is in advance of the
general resurrection before the judgment
day. He suggests that those who are
resurrected will not be obligated in the
Torah’s commandments since the Gemara

(Shabbos 30a) says, “once someone dies, he
cannot fulfill Torah and mitzvos” (Kovetz
Shi’urim, vol. 2, no. 29). The Jews who
are alive naturally will have to fulfill all the
mitzvos while those who are resurrected,
including Moshe and Aharon, will be exempt
from all commandments. We will live side by
side with righteous Jews who do not have to
hear shofar, sit in the sukkah, eat matzah, etc.
Rav Wasserman does not discuss whether
they are also exempt from prohibitions. Are
they allowed to steal, kill, marry siblings?
Will Moshe and Aharon be free to eat a
cheeseburger? It seems hard to imagine. I
think I can make a strong argument that they
will be bound by the prohibitions but that
is part of the broader discussion. Namely,
what religious or ethical guidelines apply to
creatures that are not typical beings?
III. What is a Golem?
It is hard to classify a golem as a person
because it does not contain a soul. Rav
Shmuel Edels (Maharsha; 17th cen., Poland)
proves this from a golem’s inability to speak
(Chiddushei Aggados, Sanhedrin 65b). But
even setting aside the issue of speech, a
golem lacks a soul (Rav Yehudah Aszod,
Responsa Yehudah Ya’aleh, Orach Chaim,
no. 26). However, as a reasoning being,
perhaps it is bound by the Noahide laws. Rav
Nissim Ga’on (11th cen., Tunisia) argues that
some laws are intuitive and therefore binding
without a command. These include the laws
required to maintain civil order, such as a
prohibition against murder and theft. An
argument can be made that a golem and an
AI are theologically bound by those natural,
rational laws. Likewise, other people are
bound by a prohibition against harming these
non-human beings because without such a
prohibition, society would become chaotic
and immorality would reign.
These are just the preliminary thoughts of
a junior scholar. The more important point
is that we do not necessarily have strictly
halachic tools to discuss the status of these
unnatural beings. Therefore, we need to
access our aggadic tools. By exploring our
midrashic, homiletical and philosophical
texts, we can find analogies and theories
that help us find the right categories and
approaches to apply to these unusual
situations. The golem analogy is incomplete
but it helps us ask the right questions and
points us in the direction of possible answers.