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    AI AND YESHIVA SECULAR EDUCATION

    I. The Cost of Secular Education
    The high cost of
    yeshiva tuition remains
    a significant challenge
    to many in the
    community. Artificial
    Intelligence (AI)
    promises a potential solution: it can reduce
    costs while simultaneously improving the
    education. Personalized instruction without
    the staff overhead ake AI a potential
    game changer for yeshiva secular studies,
    provided it is designed properly.
    For example, AI-based tools can provide
    personalized learning programs, giving
    each student their own content and learning
    pace. Where a human teacher may be
    responsible for dozens of students, AI
    can deliver individualized instruction
    simultaneously to all, with a teacher
    overseeing many classes as a supervisor
    and supplemental resource rather than as
    the primary educator. This technology
    would dramatically lower the need for
    staff, allowing schools to reduce payroll,
    the single largest driver of tuition costs.
    It remains to be seen whether AI can serve
    effectively as a teacher. We must also ask
    whether it may do so halachically.

    II. Teachers and Yeshiva Education
    The Talmud (Avodah Zarah 15b) rules that
    one may not send a Jewish child to a gentile
    teacher. The reason for this prohibition
    is debated by commentators. Rambam
    (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 22:5)
    explains that the concern is primarily that
    gentile teachers in the ancient world were
    free to physically abuse Jewish students.
    If that danger is absent, Rambam implies,
    the prohibition does not apply. Rashi (ad
    loc., s.v. <i>ve-ein mosrin lahem</i>),
    however, presents a dual concern: not only
    the possibility of physical harm but also
    the spiritual danger that the teacher might
    influence the child to stray from traditional
    Jewish belief and practice. According
    to Rashi, the concern for indoctrination
    remains even if physical abuse is no longer
    an issue.
    Rav Moshe Isserles (Rema; Yoreh De’ah
    153:1) follows Rashi, which the Vilna
    Gaon (glosses, ad loc.) explains is because
    the concern about improper influence
    persists. Rav Shmuel of Furth, in his Beis
    Shmuel commentary on Shulchan Aruch
    (Even Ha-Ezer 22:7), argues that Rav Yosef
    Karo likewise follows Rashi. Thus, we find
    a critical disagreement: Rambam permits
    gentile teachers under conditions of safety,

    while Rashi maintains the prohibition due
    to the risk of ideological influence. Modern
    authorities follow Rashi’s strict view.
    This seems to mean that yeshiva day schools
    should be forbidden to employ gentile
    teachers for secular subjects. And yet this
    is common practice. The explanation, I
    believe, lies in the difference between
    the ancient model and the modern school
    system. In Talmudic times, a child was sent
    to a teacher who functioned independently,
    teaching according to his own ideas. Such
    an arrangement raised both dangers outlined
    by Rambam and Rashi. Today, by contrast,
    secular teachers are employed within
    institutional frameworks. The yeshiva sets
    the curriculum, supervises instruction and
    enforces proper behavior. Teachers may not
    introduce ideological material outside of
    the approved syllabus.
    I have found little discussion of this topic
    among the major halachic authorities.
    The earliest I had found is Rav Akiva
    Schlesinger, in his 19th century polemic,
    Lev Ha-Ivri (vol. 1, p. 29n1). In his
    opposition to non-Orthodox Jews, Rav
    Schlesinger argues that those who are
    legally obligated to provide secular studies

    should hire gentile teachers rather than non-
    Orthodox Jews because the latter will be

    more likely to proselytize. In a footnote,
    he points out the Talmudic prohibition and
    argues that it only applies when a child
    goes to the teacher’s home or school to
    study. But when the teacher comes to the
    Jew’s home or to a Jewish school, it does
    not apply.
    Rav Avraham David Horowitz (20th
    cen., Israel) reached an even more
    lenient conclusion. He argues that the
    prohibition only applies when there is a
    concern that a teacher will taint his class
    with his personal beliefs. However, if a
    secular school maintains standards and
    professionalism, a Jewish student may
    attend without concern (Kinyan Torah
    Ba-Halachah, vol. 1, no. 55, par. 7). Of
    course, nowadays secular universities
    allow professors free reign to dilute their
    courses with their secular ideologies so no
    such permission remains.
    Jewish day schools do not allow
    professors to inject their personal beliefs
    into the classroom. The Jewish studies
    faculty serves as role models and life
    guides while the secular studies faculty is
    there to teach the syllabus. This practice
    would halachically justify the common
    practice of Jewish schools hiring gentile
    teachers for secular studies. However,
    those schools that, in the name of
    academic freedom, do not restrain their
    teachers would presumably fall under this
    prohibition.

    III. AI as Secular Teachers
    When applied to AI, this distinction
    becomes critical. According to Rambam’s
    view, an AI program cannot physically harm
    a child. The central concern—violence—
    does not exist. Therefore, Rambam’s
    framework would support permitting AI
    to serve as a secular studies instructor.
    According to Rashi’s approach, the concern
    of ideological influence remains. While AI
    has no beliefs of its own, its training data
    and algorithms may embed non-traditional
    or secular worldviews into its functioning.
    These could subtly shape a student’s
    thinking, precisely the concern Rashi
    articulated. On this basis, an unsupervised
    AI would be prohibited. Since the Rema
    codifies Rashi’s emphasis on ideological
    influence, the halachic presumption is that
    AI instruction would be forbidden unless
    adequate safeguards are in place.
    However, if supervision addresses the
    concerns with gentile teachers, it should
    likewise address the risks of AI. An
    AI system can be restricted through
    technical and educational “guardrails.”
    Programmers can filter its content, block
    religious or ideological commentary, and
    confine its role to secular subjects such as
    mathematics, science or language. It can
    even push it in the direction of traditional
    Jewish beliefs, forcing the AI to adopt an
    Orthodox viewpoint. In addition, rabbinic
    and educational supervisors can test the
    system’s outputs to ensure conformity with
    traditional Jewish standards. In fact, AI may
    present fewer risks than human teachers.
    While human instructors inevitably bring
    personal worldviews into the classroom, AI
    can be explicitly designed and constrained.
    It lacks independent agency. Thus, when
    properly programmed and supervised, AI
    arguably offers a safer and more controllable
    means of delivering secular education.
    For yeshivos under pressure to contain
    tuition costs, this understanding opens
    a significant opportunity. If AI can be
    implemented with the necessary safeguards,
    not eliminating secular teachers but
    reducing the head count significantly,
    schools may deliver secular education more
    effectively at far lower cost. This could
    alleviate the crushing burden on families
    while preserving the high standards of
    Torah education. By investing in oversight
    and careful design, the community can
    reduce the financial burden while enhancing
    commitment to tradition.