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    AI, GOLEM AND NOT-SO-SILLY QUESTIONS

    I. Golem and
    Minyan
    We are witnessing a
    major transformation
    of information and
    technology with the
    growth of artificial
    intelligence (AI). To my frustration, much of
    the Jewish discourse on AI begins—and often
    ends—with the halachic status of a golem. A
    golem is an often-discussed literary creature
    that is made by a pious Torah scholar through
    kabbalistic means. In the late seventeenth
    century, Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (known as the
    Chacham Tzvi) asked whether a golem can
    be counted for a minyan, a prayer quorum
    (Responsa Chacham Tzvi, no. 93). His
    analysis and the subsequent literature is often
    cited in the context of contemporary AI.
    While this analogy may seem strained—after
    all, a golem is a physical construct created
    by mystical means, while AI is code—it
    points to something deeper: our tradition’s
    attempt to grapple with beings that fall
    outside standard halachic categories. And
    this, I believe, is a much more serious and
    necessary conversation.
    Perhaps my original frustration lies with
    Chacham Tzvi’s initial question. Of course,
    a golem cannot count for a minyan. It isn’t

    a person and certainly isn’t a Jew. What is
    the question? While his conclusion is that
    you cannot count a golem for a minyan, his
    reasoning is hardly rigorous. On the one
    hand, since someone who raises an orphan
    is considered as if he birthed him (Sanhedrin
    19b). Since the actions and good deeds of the
    righteous are like their children (Rashi, Gen.
    3:9). Therefore, a golem that was created
    and raised by a righteous person is like the
    person’s child. On the other hand, the Gemara
    (Sanhedrin 65b) says that R. Zeira created a
    golem and then destroyed it. From the fact
    that R. Zeira could “kill” a golem, we see
    that it is not truly alive (Responsa Chacham
    Tzvi, no. 93). All of these arguments emerge
    from an analysis of aggadic passages that
    need not be taken literally. This seems like an
    interesting intellectual exercise rather than a
    careful, serious halachic analysis.
    Later scholars take this further. If a golem
    slaughters an animal, is it kosher (Darkei
    Teshuvah 7:11)? Does a dead golem’s corpse
    convery ritual impurity (Sidrei Taharos,
    Ohalos 5a)? May one eat a golem animal’s
    meat together with milk (Malbim, Gen.
    18:8)? If a golem finds a lost object, may
    he keep it or must he give it to his creator
    (Chashukei Chemed, Sanhedrin 65b)? As
    an intellectual exercise, this is all very
    stimulating. Indeed, an important part of

    the Talmudic method consists of
    exploring unusual, extreme cases
    to test the boundaries of the law.
    But are we supposed to take all this
    discussion of a golem seriously?
    No one alive has ever seen a golem
    and none of the arguments in any
    direction meet the standards of
    normal halachic argumentation.
    (These examples are taken from
    R. Yosie Levine, Hacham Tsevi
    Ashkenazi and the Battleground of
    the Early Modern Rabbinate, pp. 188-192,
    and R. J. David Bleich, Jewish Law and
    Contemporary Issues, pp. 373-382.)
    II. Unclassified Beings
    The answer, I believe, is that this is
    an immensely important conversation
    for developing a comprehensive Torah
    worldview. The question at hand is not
    what the status may be of a golem or an
    AI. The question is much bigger: How do
    we live in a world with beings that are not
    bound by any ethical framework? Imagine
    there was a whole class of beings who fall
    into no halachic category. How would we
    relate to them? What would we expect of
    them? Would we be allowed to lie to them,
    steal from them and even kill them without
    consequence? That seems hard to accept.
    Would the laws of forbidden relationships,
    or even assault, apply to their females?
    Presumably they would apply because
    any answer to the contrary would lead to
    absurd results. The question, then, is why.
    What category applies to such unnatural
    beings? The stakes are high because at the
    rate that technology seems to be advancing,
    this minor curiosity will soon become a
    widespread reality.
    The midrash says that Yosef told his
    father that his brothers were, among other
    things, eating from live animals and acting
    improperly with girls (Rashi, Gen. 37:2).
    Rav Yeshayahu Horowitz (Shelah; 17th
    cen., Germany) asks how the brothers
    could have acted so improperly and
    contrary to Jewish law? He answers that the
    animals and the girls were created through
    kabbalah but Yosef did not realize that this
    was the case. In other words, unnaturally
    created beings do not have the same rights
    and protections as those naturally born. If
    generalized, this opinion on this limited
    circumstance would imply that it would be
    perfectly moral to assault a life-like female
    robot. That seems an unlikely conclusion.
    Rav Elchanan Wasserman (20th cen.,
    Belarus) quotes earlier sources that say
    that in the times of Mashiach, there
    will be a resurrection of the deceased
    righteous which is in advance of the
    general resurrection before the judgment
    day. He suggests that those who are
    resurrected will not be obligated in the
    Torah’s commandments since the Gemara

    (Shabbos 30a) says, “once someone dies, he
    cannot fulfill Torah and mitzvos” (Kovetz
    Shi’urim, vol. 2, no. 29). The Jews who
    are alive naturally will have to fulfill all the
    mitzvos while those who are resurrected,
    including Moshe and Aharon, will be exempt
    from all commandments. We will live side by
    side with righteous Jews who do not have to
    hear shofar, sit in the sukkah, eat matzah, etc.
    Rav Wasserman does not discuss whether
    they are also exempt from prohibitions. Are
    they allowed to steal, kill, marry siblings?
    Will Moshe and Aharon be free to eat a
    cheeseburger? It seems hard to imagine. I
    think I can make a strong argument that they
    will be bound by the prohibitions but that
    is part of the broader discussion. Namely,
    what religious or ethical guidelines apply to
    creatures that are not typical beings?
    III. What is a Golem?
    It is hard to classify a golem as a person
    because it does not contain a soul. Rav
    Shmuel Edels (Maharsha; 17th cen., Poland)
    proves this from a golem’s inability to speak
    (Chiddushei Aggados, Sanhedrin 65b). But
    even setting aside the issue of speech, a
    golem lacks a soul (Rav Yehudah Aszod,
    Responsa Yehudah Ya’aleh, Orach Chaim,
    no. 26). However, as a reasoning being,
    perhaps it is bound by the Noahide laws. Rav
    Nissim Ga’on (11th cen., Tunisia) argues that
    some laws are intuitive and therefore binding
    without a command. These include the laws
    required to maintain civil order, such as a
    prohibition against murder and theft. An
    argument can be made that a golem and an
    AI are theologically bound by those natural,
    rational laws. Likewise, other people are
    bound by a prohibition against harming these
    non-human beings because without such a
    prohibition, society would become chaotic
    and immorality would reign.
    These are just the preliminary thoughts of
    a junior scholar. The more important point
    is that we do not necessarily have strictly
    halachic tools to discuss the status of these
    unnatural beings. Therefore, we need to
    access our aggadic tools. By exploring our
    midrashic, homiletical and philosophical
    texts, we can find analogies and theories
    that help us find the right categories and
    approaches to apply to these unusual
    situations. The golem analogy is incomplete
    but it helps us ask the right questions and
    points us in the direction of possible answers.