01 Jun AMIRAH LAKELEV?!

And to the entire
Jewish People, a dog
shall not wag his
tongue, at human or
beast, so that it be
known that Hashem
distinguishes between

Egypt and Yisrael.
Shemos 11:7
Introduction
There is a general prohibition of amirah

l’Akum, that one is not permitted to ask a non-
Jew to perform melachah for him on Shabbos

or to benefit from a melachah performed
specifically on his behalf. In a particular
instance, a Jew who lives on a very high floor
of an apartment building trained his dog to
push the correct button for him when he enters
the elevator. Is this included in the issur of
amira l’Akum, since the Jew is benefitting
from melachah done on his behalf on Shabbos,
or was there never a gezeirah against asking or
training one’s animals to help him on Shabbos?
Are there other possible issues that arise in
this situation?
Amirah L’Akum
There are three main reasons given for why
Chazal prohibited amirah l’Akum. Rashi in
Avodah Zarah (15a, s.v. keivan) writes that it
is because of the issur of “mimtzo cheftzecha

vedaber davar” (Yeshayahu 58:13); on
Shabbos, one is not supposed to speak about
matters related to melachah. If this is the
reason, it likely does not matter whether one is
speaking to a non-Jew or to a dog. Such a
request is still prohibited. On the other hand, if
one has trained his dog to press the correct
button upon entering the elevator without
issuing a formal command, it would likely not
be a violation according to this reason.
A second reason, offered by Rashi in Shabbos
(121a, s.v. kabeh, and 153a, s.v. mai),
considers the issue of shelichus. If one
requests that a non-Jew perform a melachah
on his behalf, he is making the non-Jew into
his shaliach, and we hold that a shaliach is
considered the same as the one who sent him.
Although we generally hold that the halacha
of shelichus does not apply to a non-Jew, the
Shulchan Aruch HaRav (243:1) and others
point out that we hold that “yesh shelichus
l’akum lechumra” – the principle of shelichus
does apply to a non-Jew in certain areas of
stringency. This reason would certainly not
apply to an animal, as there is no concept of
shelichus between a Jew and his pet.
Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Har Tzvi, OC 1:174)
discusses a case in which one’s animal is
trained to do melachah for him, ruling that it is
a “grama b’alma,” an indirect action that is not

on the level of melachah. Rav Frank makes
the distinction between the issue of dibbur on
Shabbos, which would be a problem if one
commands the animal to perform a melachah,
and shelichus, which would never be a
problem with an animal.
Ma’aseh Shabbos
A third reason to forbid amirah l’Akum is
explained by the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos
6:1). He points out that if we were to have a
non-Jew perform all kinds of melachah on our
behalf on Shabbos, it would be a terrible
disgrace to the sanctity of Shabbos; it would
turn our Shabbos into another weekday. If this
is the motivation for prohibiting amirah
l’Akum, it would likely apply to one’s dog as
well. Nevertheless, we do not find an explicit
prohibition to benefit from melachos done by
one’s animal based on amirah l’Akum.
Mechamer
Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein (Melachim
Omnayich, p.37) discusses a situation in
which one has a trained monkey to perform
melachos for him on Shabbos. He cites a
ruling of Rav Bentziyon Abba Shaul (Shu”t
Ohr LeTziyon 23), based on a Gemara in
Shabbos (19a):
The Sages taught: One may place food before
a dog in a courtyard. If the dog takes it and
goes out, one is not responsible for it.

Similarly, one may place food before a non-
Jew in a courtyard. If the non-Jew takes it

and goes out, one is not responsible for it.
Why do we need both cases? Aren’t they the
same? The teaching is necessary to clarify:
You might have thought that there is a
difference, as the dog is dependent on its
owner, while the non-Jew is not dependent.
Therefore, the beraisa informs us that the
same rule applies in both cases.”
The Gemara questions why we need to learn
both cases of the dog and the gentile, since
neither of them are obligated to keep
Shabbos. Rav Abba Shaul notes that the
Gemara should have answered that there is

certainly a need to add the case of the non-
Jew, since there is an issur of amirah l’Akum

for a non-Jew and not for a dog. From the
fact that the Gemara does not make this
distinction, we see that there is, in fact, a
prohibition of amirah that applies to animals
as well.
Rav Zilberstein records that he asked Rav
Abba Shaul why he was only concerned
with the issur derabbanan of amirah. Why
was he not concerned with the issur d’oraysa
of mechamer, the Biblical prohibition to
guide an animal in doing melachah, even if
the animal does all of the work? The Mishna
Berura (264:7) points out that one should
not raise his voice in a manner that causes a
donkey to carry something in a reshus
harabbim, as that would qualify as
mechamer. This scenario seems to fit the
same description.
Rav Zilberstein suggests why mechamer
might not be a problem. The Avnei Neizer
(OC 1:196) notes that if someone sends his

dog to attack
another animal
on Shabbos, this
is considered a
violation of an
issur derabbanan.
It is not a violation of mechamer, because we
view the dog as acting on its own accord and
not fully following the guidance of its master.
The master’s command merely serves to
excite the dog and alert it to the task at hand,
but the decision to actually attack the other
animal is that of the dog.
Rav Zilberstein utilizes this theory in the case
of the trained monkey that performs melachah
on behalf of its owner. One violates mechamer
on a Torah level only when actually guiding
the animal through the melachah. In this case,
in contrast, one merely places the suggestion
in the animal’s mind, and the animal chooses
to follow through on its own.
This seems to be the explanation of the
Gemara in Shabbos (53a) that one may call an
animal to come to him. The Gemara does not
consider this to be mechamer, since the animal
is choosing to come to its owner and is not
being actively guided through the process.
Shevisas Beheimah
The Yalkut Yosef (Ch. 307, p. 232) raises the
issue of shevisas beheimah, the Torah
requirement to have animals that one owns
refrain from melachah on Shabbos. The din of
shevisas beheimah is similar to the issur of
mechamer, but mechamer applies to a Jew
guiding any animal to work, whereas shevisas
beheimah applies only to an animal that one
owns and can be violated whenever the animal
is doing melachah on one’s behalf, even if he
is not specifically guiding it (see Shulchan
Aruch, OC 246). The Yalkut Yosef suggests
that a simple way to avoid violating the
prohibition of shevisas beheimah is to make
one’s animal hefker before Shabbos, so that it
is no longer “his” animal. This is explicit in
Shulchan Aruch (OC 246:3). However, it is
questionable whether one truly intends to
make his animal ownerless in this situation,
considering that he has no actual intention of
relinquishing his rights to it, and it is therefore
unclear if this method would work.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that we accept Rav Bentziyon
Abba Shaul’s proof that amirah l’Akum
applies to animals as well, and there is no issur
to merely hint to a dog to perform melachah
on Shabbos. Similarly, there may be no issur
of mechamer based on Rav Zilberstein’s
distinction, and one can similarly avoid the
problem of shevisas beheimah by declaring
the animal hefker. Nevertheless, the problem
of zilzul Shabbos remains a major issue.
Although one can contend with all of the
halachic considerations involved in this case,
on a practical level, one should certainly avoid
using trained animals to perform melachos for
him on Shabbos.