20 Jul ARGUING AUSTRITT
As we discussed
previously, on
July 28, 1876 —
150 years ago
— the Prussian
parliament (part of
the broader German legislative system at
the time) passed a law allowing secession
(austritt) from a Jewish community
without formally renouncing affiliation
with Judaism. This was a law that Rav
Samson Raphael Hirsch had lobbied
heavily for. Once austritt became legal,
Rav Hirsch ruled that Orthodox Jews
in his city of Frankfurt am Main were
religiously obligated to secede from the
Reform-dominated Jewish community
and join his independent Orthodox
community.
Many leading members of the Frankfurt
Orthodox community refused to secede
and received sanction for their behavior
from Rav Yitzchak Dov (Seligmann
Baer) Bamberger, the rabbi and rosh
yeshiva of Wurzburg. In a painful and
lengthy exchange, Rav Hirsch and Rav
Bamberger publicly debated this subject
in a series of open letters in early 1877
(included in The Collected Writings of
Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, vol. 6, pp.
198-317). To be clear, Rav Bamberger
did not oppose austritt but also, given
the specific circumstances in Frankfurt,
did not require it. Once the organized
Jewish community allowed the Orthodox
members autonomy to run their own
religious services and agreed that any
dues paid to the community would not
go to non-Orthodox religious services,
Rav Bamberger felt that was sufficient to
permit remaining a member.
I would like to examine here the
main arguments Rav Hirsch gave to
require secession and Rav Bamberger’s
arguments to allow remaining in the
broader community. Rav Hirsch made
five primary arguments, although the two
discuss much more:
1) The Problem of Membership
Rav Hirsch writes that voluntary
membership in an organization implies
approval of everything the organization
does. This is forbidden because it
constitutes approval of non-Orthodox
religious activities. (p. 202) This is a very
strict position that does not match my
experience in other areas of life. Does
membership in AARP, for example, mean
that every member agrees with every
decision the organization’s leadership
makes? Some people are purists and resign
over any disagreement. Most people
remain members of an organization if
they receive important benefits or agree
with most of the organization’s positions.
Requiring full agreement seems like a
recipe for complete isolation. It would
also mean that if the official Orthodox
community ever takes a position with
which you disagree strongly, you must
resign from that community also or
implicitly support that position.
2) Validating Reform
Rav Hirsch writes that even after the
Reform community’s concessions,
membership in the community implies
that Reform has full validity as long as
it tolerates the existence of Orthodoxy.
This is forbidden because it likewise
constitutes approval of non-Orthodox
religious activities. (pp. 202, 214) Like
the previous argument, this claim is
based on the implications of an action
and depends on general intent and
perception. Because most people do not
intend by membership to imply validity
to every aspect of the organization, and
it is not perceived as such by the broad
population, it is hard to accept this
argument.
Rav Bamberger adds another
consideration. What if you explicitly
declare that you reject the non-Orthodox
religious activities? The clear statement
should remove the implication of
approval. Indeed, the very terms of
the Reform community’s concessions
codify the rejection of non-Orthodox
religious activities. (p. 248) Rav Hirsch
responds that this is insufficient to
remove the implication of approval. (p.
300) Perhaps he means that, realistically,
the average person on the street will see
that Orthodox Jews are members of the
Reform community, which means that
they accept the different movements. I
suspect that there is an element of truth to
this. Over time, peaceful coexistence can
come to be understood as recognition of
the other movement’s religious validity.
Although perhaps there are strategies
to prevent that from happening without
disturbing communal harmony.
3) Distancing From Minus
Rav Hirsch writes that non-Orthodox
movements have the status of minus,
idolatrous heresy. The Gemara (Avodah
Zarah 17a) says that Jews are obligated to
distance themselves from minus because
it attracts people away from traditional
Judaism. Therefore, we must stay away
from non-Orthodox movements. (p.
203) Rav Bamberger replies that minus
refers specifically to idolatry and not
to heretical movements. (p. 246) Rav
Hirsch responds that Rambam says
that minus applies also to heretical
movements. (p. 278) While Rav Hirsch
is correct about Rambam’s view, Rav
Bamberger seems to follow Rashi’s
view that minus refers specifically to
idolatry. This boils down to a debate
among medieval commentators, with
Rav Hirsch following Rambam and
Rav Bamberger following Rashi.
Rav Bamberger argues that Reform’s
religious error is inadvertent, which
some authorities treat as less severe, and
that Reform’s willingness to facilitate
Orthodox practice shows that it does not
deny the Torah’s binding authority “vis-
a-vis the Orthodox.” (p. 237) Perhaps
this means that Reform’s rejection of
tradition is out of convenience rather than
theology. I find that hard to sustain and
Rav Hirsch likewise strongly disagrees
with this. (p. 294)
Rav Moshe (Maharam) Schick from
Hungary sent a letter to Rav Bamberger,
asking him to retract his ruling (Responsa
Maharam Schick, Orach Chaim, no.
306), taking a stricter, and arguably more
consistent, position than Rav Hirsch,
who holds that separation applies to
non-Orthodox movements but not to
individuals. (pp. 206, 297) If the concern
is influence, behavior and attitudes that
negate and often denigrate traditional
Jewish beliefs and practices, why is social
interaction acceptable? Maharam Schick
requires full separation, much as you
would not socialize with missionaries.
4) Financial Support
Rav Hirsch argues that paying dues to
the Reform community supports the non-
Orthodox movement, which constitutes
the prohibited act of machazik yedei
overei aveirah. (p. 209) Even if the dues do
not go directly to non-Orthodox religious
activities, they go to the overhead and
administration that allow the non-
Orthodox to continue their religious
activities. (p. 301) This seems similar to
the question of whether Orthodox Jews
may support local federations which use
some of that money for overhead and
for support of non-Orthodox religious
institutions. Rav Moshe Feinstein forbids
donating to federations that support non-
Orthodox religious institutions unless
Orthodox institutions receive more funds
than Orthodox Jews donate. In this way,
the money Orthodox Jews donate does
not contribute in any way to support
of non-Orthodox institutions (Iggeros
Moshe, Yoreh De’ah, vol. 1 no. 149).
This seems to conform with Rav Hirsch’s
position.
5) Non-Orthodox Courts
Rav Hirsch also argued that the agreement
was insufficient because the Reform
community will have a representative
on the board of the Orthodox sub-
community which will decide financial
matters. It is forbidden to bring monetary
claims before a non-Orthodox court
(Gittin 88b). (p. 211) I find this confusing
because the prohibition refers to courts.
If the board would adjudicate disputes
between parties, then maybe it would
qualify for this prohibition. However, if
it merely decides how to allocate funds,
it seems a stretch to call it a court. In Rav
Feinstein’s discussion of federations, he
does not raise this concern at all.
Reading this exchange 150 years later,
the practical predictions underlying
the halachic arguments stand out most
clearly. Rav Bamberger trusted that
explicit disclaimers and negotiated
safeguards, i.e. Orthodox control over its
own services and dues walled off from
non-Orthodox activities, would prevent
any false impression of validation. Rav
Hirsch doubted that trust would hold: he
worried about the impression left once
the dust settled and the disclaimers were
forgotten. A century and a half later, with
the circumstances on the ground very
different, it’s hard to say which of the two
scholars’ concerns would still hold today.