
27 May CAN AI WRITE A SEFER?
I. AI Authorship
Is it permissible to
study Torah from a
sefer, a text of Torah
scholarship, written by
artificial intelligence
(AI)? There are
different ways an AI
could author a sefer. For our purposes, we
can divide authorship in Torah literature into
four main forms:
1) Summarizing Existing Texts: This includes
abridgments, digests, or restatements
of material found in classical texts and
commentaries. For example, an AI could
create a Kitzur Abarbanel, a concise
commentary on the Torah summarizing
Abarbanel’s lengthy commentary.
2) Consolidating Decisions: It is common
nowadays for authors to gather different
rulings on a specific topic into a text. There
are volumes on the laws of blessings, the
second day of Yom Tov, sending away a
mother bird and much more. This kind of
authorship involves significant judgment in
selection and organization but often, albeit
with important exceptions, does not involve
much originality. An AI can consolidate
existing rulings on any topic from a vast
database of responsa and commentaries.
3) Connecting Texts: Torah is a web of
interconnected ideas and great Torah works
often draw connections between sources.
For example, a running commentary on the
Ein Ya’akov could quote other passages with
similar language and, based on these two
side-by-side texts, suggest an interpretation
that connects these passages. This involves
broad knowledge of texts and the ability to
create an original interpretation based on the
different texts.
4) Presenting Original Analysis: The
hallmark of Torah creativity is chidush,
innovative interpretations. Whether in Jewish
law or thought, the author here offers a novel
interpretation or argument based on rigorous
thinking and comparative study. AI can be
trained on the chidushim literature and learn
the different methodologies of interpretation.
Maybe not today but perhaps someday an AI
could write an entirely new commentary or
sefer with chidushim.
Already today, the technology probably
exists for AI to perform within the first two of
these modes. With the proper prompting and
training, it can summarize and consolidate
texts and opinions. In the near future, AI
likely will also be able to juxtapose differing
opinions, draw connections across vast
literatures and even offer novel insights. Even
if these are just mechanical reorganizations of
data and following established methodologies,
the result would be a sefer indistinguishable
from the many sefarim we see on bookstore
shelves. AI may produce Torah content, but is
it actually Torah?
II. Inappropriate Teachers
The concern that emerges most forcefully in
this context is whether studying from such
a work constitutes learning Torah from an
inappropriate teacher, a rav she-eino hagun.
The Gemara (Chagigah 15b) tells the story
of R. Meir learning Torah from Elisha ben
Avuyah, known as Acher, who went astray:
”And how could R. Meir learn Torah from
Acher? Didn’t Rabbah bar bar Chanah say
in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: ‘What is
the meaning of the verse: “For the priest’s
lips should keep knowledge, and they should
seek Torah from his mouth; for he is an angel
of the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:7)? If the
teacher is similar to a heavenly angel, seek
Torah from him; but if not, do not seek Torah
from him.’ [R. Meir found another verse to
justify it…] Do not the verses contradict each
other? This is not difficult: one verse is about
a senior (gadol) and the other is about a junior
(katan).”
One reason offered for this prohibition
against learning from an improper teacher
is that you might learn from his improper
behavior. Rashi (ad loc., s.v. gadol) says
that the exception mentioned in the Gemara
for a senior is because he will know to be
careful to avoid learning from the teacher’s
behavior. Tosafos (Ta’anis 7a s.v. im)
explain likewise. Rav Tzadok HaKohen
Rabinowitz (19th cen., Poland) offers an
alternative view. He says that when you
learn Torah from a teacher, you have to feel
as if the teachings come from divine sources
(Resisei Lailah, p. 52, no. 34, quoted in R.
Moshe Zuriel, Leket Peirushei Aggadah,
Chagigah 15b). According to R. Tzadok,
the Torah teachings of an inappropriate
teacher lack this extra level. The first view
believes that a Torah teacher must not lack a
base level of observance. The second view
believes that a Torah teacher requires an
extra level.
These views have practical implications
regarding AI. According to the first
approach, the issue is imitation of bad
actions. In that respect, AI is not a human
being—it has no character, no deeds and no
personality to emulate. An AI does not have
the lacking that an inappropriate teacher
has. But according to the second approach,
that a Torah teacher requires an extra level,
an AI does not rise to it. An AI is not holy
like an angel and does not teach Torah as
part of the traditional chain of transmission.
Therefore, if we follow the first approach,
we would have no problem studying Torah
that is taught by an AI. But if we follow the
second approach, an AI would not be an
appropriate Torah teacher.
III. The Written Word
An additional consideration is whether the
prohibition of learning from an inappropriate
teacher applies even to writings. Rav Shabsai
Cohen (the Shach; 17th cen., Poland) asks
why Rambam does not quote the distinction
in the above Gemara between a senior (gadol)
and a junior (katan). He suggests either
that nowadays everyone is on a lower and
considered a katan or that this distinction
belongs to R. Meir while we follow the
Sages who disagree with him (Shach, Yoreh
De’ah 246:8). Rav Avraham de Boton (16th
cen., Turkey) had already pointed out that
we cannot say that Rambam was speaking of
nowadays, when we are all juniors, because
Rambam wrote for all times, even including
laws that we cannot observe today. Rather, he
concludes, Rambam must have ruled against
R. Meir (Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Talmud
Torah 4:1).
Rav Yirmiyahu Loew (19th cen., Hungary)
argues that it is difficult to say that Rambam
rules against R. Meir because Rambam
himself studied works of idolatry and heresy
(Divrei Yirmiyahu, Hilchos Talmud Torah
4:1). Indeed, Rav Yitzchak Bar Sheishes (15th
cen., Algeria) suggests that Rambam must
have considered himself a senior in order to
allow himself to study inappropriate material
(Responsa Rivash, no. 45). Rav Loew
explains that there is a difference between
studying directly from someone and studying
from his writings. A mature reader, someone
senior, can reflect critically on the writings
and accept the good while rejecting the bad.
He is much less subject to the charisma of
the speaker. Rav Yosef Zechariah Stern (19th
cen., Lithuania) rules similarly (Responsa
Zeicher Yehosef, Yoreh De’ah, no. 173), as
does Rav Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer
(19th cen., Hungary; Kesav Sofer Al Ha-
Torah, 1995 edition, p. 493). Rav Yehudah
Loewe (Maharal; 16th cen., Czech) writes
similarly regarding studying secular subjects
from books (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha-Torah,
ch. 14). However, Rav Aharon Aryeh Katz
(cont., Israel) writes that many contemporary
authorities rule strictly and forbid reading
books by inappropriate teachers (Pesakim
U-Teshuvos, Yoreh De’ah 246:30).
According to the view that you may not learn
from an inappropriate teacher because you
might follow his bad ways, this would not
apply to an AI. Even according to the view
that a teacher must be part of the chain of
tradition, which an AI is not, many authorities
allow a senior, a well-trained adult, to learn
from such a teacher or at least from a sefer
written by such a teacher. It would seem
that there is room within halachah for a
sefer written by AI, even one containing
chidushim, provided it is reviewed by senior
scholars and given approbations asserting to
its beneficial content.