27 Aug ENLISTING IN THE IDF

I. Employment and
Slavery
The issue of drafting
Israeli yeshiva
students into the IDF
is a perennial political
topic. I would like to
discuss a related topic
but without any political connection. In
order to survive, a country has to be able to
draft soldiers into its army. In halachah, we
call that part of mishpetei ha-meluchah, the
governmental mandate discussed in 1 Samuel
8 and in Rambam’s Mishneh Torah (Hilchos
Melachim 4). Rambam (ibid., 10) refers to
soldiers as a king’s “servants and soldiers.”
What is the difference between these two
groups? Rav Eliezer Waldenburg (20th cen.,
Israel) explains that the servants are those
who are drafted into the standing army while
the soldiers are those who volunteer during
wartime. I would like to discuss a third type
of soldier — someone who voluntarily enlists
into the standing army. Is it halachically
permissible to enlist? This is not a question
related to current political arguments but
something more basic and fundamental in
halachah and in Jewish thought.
The Gemara (Bava Metzi’a 10a) derives the
fact that an employee may quit at any time
from the verse “For to me the children of
Israel are slaves” (Lev. 25:55) — slaves to
G-d and not slaves to people. An employee

is not a slave and therefore he has the right to
quit, even in the middle of a workday. While
a person can sell himself into slavery, it is
forbidden to do so absent extreme financial
need. If that is the case, how is a person
allowed to enlist in the army where he is not
allowed to quit in the middle of his service,
which could be two or three years long? Does
that not constitute submission to some form
of servitude, at least according to halachah?
If he is drafted, then he has no choice. How
can he volunteer for a military service that
effectively turns him into a slave in the sense
that he cannot quit anytime?
II. Perishable Merchandise
An important exemption to this employment
is when the employee deals with perishable
items. The Mishnah (Bava Metzi’a 75b)
and subsequent Gemara discuss when an
employee is and is not allowed to quit on the
spot. If he is working on a perishable item and
his quitting would cause that item to decline in
value, what is called a davar ha-avud, then he
is required to finish his work. His right to quit
does not give him the right to cause financial
damage to his employer. Later authorities
expand this beyond perishable merchandise
to other cases where an employee quitting
causes non-financial damage to an employer.
In an important responsum, Rav Yisrael
Isserlein (15th cen., Austria) expands on the
rules of employment (Terumas Ha-Deshen
1:329). Regarding house servants, he writes

that if they leave in the middle of their term
of employment, their employers will be
unable to perform basic house functions and
perishable items will go bad. This constitutes
a davar ha-avud. He ends that this matter is
not entirely clear. Rav Isserlein seems to be
extending the concept of davar ha-avud away
from perishable merchandise to any loss by
the employer. If an employee quitting causes
an unavoidable loss, he must work for his full
term.
Rav Moshe Isserles (Rema; 16th cen.,
Poland) quotes this ruling without
qualification (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen
Mishpat 333:5). However, Rav Shmuel de
Modina (Maharshdam; 16th cen., Greece)
notes that Rav Isserlein was non-committal
and therefore leaves the employee the right
to quit mid-term, especially when the owner
can find a way to handle the responsibilities
himself (Responsa Maharshdam, Choshen
Mishpat 1:119). Rav Shabsai Cohen (17th
cen., Poland) writes that this is left to the
judgment of a rabbinic judge (Shulchan
Aruch, ad loc., no. 23).
In other words, in some cases, a house
servant accepts a job without the right to quit
anytime because his quitting would cause an
unavoidable loss to his employer. Does this
apply to an enlisted soldier? In times when
the army is short of manpower, every soldier
is needed. Perhaps in such a case, it would
be permissible to enlist even without the right
to quit because regardless he would not be
allowed to leave mid-term.
However, Rav Yair Chaim Bacharach (17th
cen., Germany) discusses a case in which
a maidservant for a grumpy old lady could
not take her boss’ abuse anymore and quit
halfway through her six month initial term
of employment (Chavos Yair, no. 106).
Because she quit, the employer could not
perform some of her basic daily tasks. Rav
Bacharach rules that if the employer has
multiple servants who can carry the slack or
can otherwise get by without this particular
maidservant, then the employee may leave
mid-term. While every situation is different,
it seems that a standing army has enough
soldiers that one person quitting would
not cause irreparable harm because other
soldiers can carry the slack. It might be
uncomfortable, but it is possible, although
this might vary by unit. It seems that davar
ha-avud does not offer a broad avenue to
permit enlisting in the army.
III. Holy Service
Rav Bacharach was asked about a cantor
who had accepted a position by vowing to
remain at the post for ten years but after three
years was offered another lucrative position
(Chavos Yair, no. 140). The cantor argues
that he is forbidden to accept a job for ten
years and therefore his vow is null and void,
and he may leave for another position. Rav
Bacharach replies that the prohibition to
accept a job with no option to leave is based
on the idea that we are servants of G-d, not
people. However, a cantor’s job is prayer,
making him a servant of G-d. Therefore,

the prohibition does not apply to him and he
may accept a cantorial position for ten years
without an option to leave. Rav Bacharach
argues that this applies only to a cantor and
not to a Torah teacher. We are not allowed to
accept direct payment for teaching Torah and
therefore a teacher is paid for minor activities,
whether babysitting or teaching how to read,
which do not constitute serving G-d. This
distinction is important because Rema (ibid.,
333:3) says explicitly that a Torah teacher or
a scribe may not accept a job for more than
three years because of the above concern.
Rav Bacharach says that a cantor is different.
Rav Aryeh Leib Heller (19th cen., Ukraine)
argues with Rav Bacharach’s distinction

regarding a Torah teacher (Ketzos Ha-
Choshen 333:7). Is there anyone serving G-d

more than a teacher of Torah? Rather, since
we see that a Torah teacher may quit anytime,
we can deduce that a cantor may, as well.
Rav Yaakov Reischer (18th cen., Germany)
likewise disagrees with Rav Bacharach’s
claim that someone working as a professional
Jew, whether a cantor or Torah teacher, is
exempt from the ability to quit anytime
(Shevus Ya’akov l, vol. 1, no. 6). However,
Rav Avraham David Wahrman of Buchach
(19th cen., Ukraine) defends Rav Bacharach’s
distinction between a Torah teacher and a
cantor (Kesef Ha-Kodashim on the Ketzos, ad
loc.). After all, the teacher of young students
is primarily a babysitter. According to Rav
Bacharach and Rav Wahrman, someone who
serves G-d in his work is not subject to the
requirement of being able to quit anytime.
Rav Ya’akov Ariel (cont., Israel) is the
retired rabbi of Ramat Gan and, among other
positions, the President of the Hesder Yeshiva
of Ramat Gan. He was asked about soldiers
who are drafted and qualify for special
service that involves additional training
and a longer term in the army. Is a drafted
soldier who qualifies for this special service
allowed to volunteer for a longer term of
army service? This is a unique instance of
the question with which we began. Rav Ariel
acknowledges the halachic issue and follows
Rav Bacharach’s view that someone serving
G-d in his job is not subject to the above
concern. An IDF soldier is protecting G-d’s
people on G-d’s land. He is not a servant to
man but a servant of G-d. Therefore, Rav
Ariel concludes, a soldier may volunteer for
a longer army service with no ability to quit.
Presumably, someone exempt from the draft
may also volunteer to serve in the IDF for the
same reason.