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    12 Mar Kahanism and Democracy Part 2

    Posted at 17:51h in by
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    I. COMMENTING

    ON THE BIBLE

    Last week, we began discussing R. Meir Kahane’s view of democracy, as presented in his book, Or Ha-Ra’ayon. As we noted, R. Kahane failed to discuss Shmuel’s criticism of the monarchy (1 Sam. 8). In contrast, R. Eliezer Waldenburg (Hilchos Medinah, vol. 1, 3:1) surveys the commentarial approaches to Shmuel’s apparent objection to appointing a king. Quoting from a wide spectrum of sources, he shows the varying attitudes to this subject. In particular, R. Waldenburg cites the important views of Rabbenu Nissim (Ran) and R. Yitzchak Abarbanel.

    Ran (Derashos Ha-Ran, no. 11) argues for a separation of powers between the courts and the king. The courts legislate based on Torah law while the king leads wars and exercises extra-judicial power in unusual circumstances that require special attention. In the absence of a king, the courts perform both functions but the king can never fulfill the courts’ mandate. According to Ran, the Jews erred in asking from Shmuel a king who will serve in the courts’ role.

    Abarbanel (commentary to Deut. and 1 Sam.) sees the appointment of a king as a concession to frail human nature, a sub-optimal arrangement the Torah allows but does not require. Absolute power is subject to easy abuse. While the Torah establishes a few safeguards to prevent a king from deviating from propriety, it cannot guarantee a king’s goodness and indeed history has proven the probability of a wayward king. The Jews should never have asked for a king and Shmuel was correct in his objection to their request.

    Abarbanel’s rejection of monarchy as an ideal and Ran’s preference for a limited monarchy are far cries from R. Kahane’s insistence that the Maimonidean framework of mandatory monarchy is the only legitimately Jewish approach. R. Waldenburg ends his summary of the different commentarial views by citing the Shelah‘s contention (on Deut.) that Rabbenu Nissim’s view is most preferable. R. Shaul Yisraeli (Amud Ha-Yemini, 7:5) also adopts an element of Ran’s approach.

    On the other hand, the Netziv (Ha’amek Davar, Deut. 17:14) adopts an approach somewhere between Rambam and Abarbanel. Noting the Torah’s unusual language implying that the obligation to appoint a king is contingent on the people asking for it, Netziv suggests that Jews can choose whichever type of government they prefer. Not every government is appropriate for every time and place. Therefore, Jews should look around at other nations’ governments and decide which form works best for them. If it is a monarchy, then–and only then–they are commanded to appoint a king.

    II. TALMUDIC DEBATE

    R. Kahane presents the obligation to appoint a king as a straightforward verse in the Bible and commandment listed by the Rambam. However, the Talmud (Sanhedrin 20b) presents a debate over whether there is an obligation. According to R. Yehudah, there exists an obligation to appoint a king. However, according to R. Nehorai (as explained by Rashi), there is no command to appoint a king but if the people do so, the Torah limits the king’s rights in specific ways.

    Additionally, R. Kahane fails to cite talmudic examples of democracy. R. Shlomo Goren (Toras Ha-Medinah, ch. 5) begins his discussion of Jewish self-government by citing the talmudic requirement for appointment as a public official–prior public consent (Berachos 55a). This, R. Goren argues, is an example of democracy in the Talmud. The public as a whole must choose its officials.

    R. Eliezer Waldenburg (Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 2 nos. 22, 23; Hilchos Medinah, vol. 3, 3:1) quotes from the Mishnah and Gemara (Bava Basra 7a, 8b) that townspeople may force each other to pay taxes for communal needs and follow regulations regarding business conduct. Rabbenu Tam (quoted in Mordechai, Bava Basra 480) explains that this is done through the “seven high-ranking townsmen” (shivah tuvei ha-ir) who are appointed by the community. As the Talmud Yerushalmi (Megillah 3:2) makes clear, whomever the townspeople appoint as their leader may act on their behalf and for their benefit, but generally it consisted of seven officials. These elected officials are allowed to establish laws and taxes, and buy and sell public property. These are all legitimate forms of democratic self-government.

    (to be continued)