20 Feb KILLING WITH THE DIVINE NAME

In 1927, when Rav
Ahron Soloveichik
was 10 years old,
he sent a letter to
his older brother
Rav Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, who at
the time was studying
in Berlin. The young Ahreleh wrote an
impressive essay, which is recorded,
along with the reactions of his father

and brother, in Iggeros Ha-Grid Ha-
Levi (pp. 272-275).

I. Divine Punishment
Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos
Melachim 10:6, Hilchos Chovel
U-Mazik 5:3) writes that a Gentile who
injures a Jew is subject to the death
penalty but only by divine hands, not
human. No court may punish him.
Rambam learns this from the Talmud
(Sanhedrin 58b) based on Moshe (Ex.
2:12), who saw an Egyptian injuring
a Jew and killed him. The question
is where in that verse Rambam sees a
proof to his position.
Rav Ahron answers based on Rashi (Ex.

2:14) that Moshe killed the Egyptian
through use of the divine name. This
is not a direct killing but only indirect
causation (gerama). And even though
the Rambam (Hilchos Rotzei’ach
3:10) rules that even causing a death
is forbidden, the Mishneh Le-Melech
quotes the Ritva that causing a death
through speech is not punished even by
divine hands.
Therefore, Moshe punished the
Egyptian for injuring a Jew specifically
by killing him with the divine name.
The Egyptian was not liable for human
punishment, only divine punishment.
Killing him any other way would have
been forbidden. Moshe punished him
through the divine name because the
Egyptian was only liable for divine
punishment. This, then, is Rambam’s
proof that a Gentile who injures a Jew is
not punished by human hands.
Rav Moshe Soloveichik, Rav Ahron’s
father, adds that while he is proud of
his young son’s accomplishments, he
disagrees with his statement that killing
someone with the divine name is only
causative. Rather, it is not killing at all.

This does not mean that it is permissible
to kill someone with the divine name
rather that it is not classified as killing
but prohibited for other reasons.
Rav Joseph Soloevitchik also responds
with admiration (“I could not believe
my eyes”). However, he adds that
the Mishneh Le-Melech‘s position
that causation through words is not
considered causation is difficult. Why
should it matter how someone causes
the action? Rather, Ritva was referring
to someone who hires a hitman, i.e.
tells someone else to commit murder.
In that case, the person doing the telling
is not guilty of causing the murder. But
causing someone’s death by invoking
the divine name is directly causing the
death. Both brothers disagree with their
father.
II. Debate Over Divine Murder
Perhaps we can find support for the
young Rav Ahron in a debate among
great Sephardic sages. Rav Yisrael
Ya’akov Chagiz (17th cen., Israel;
Halachos Ketanos 2:98) writes similarly
in a brief responsum. He asks whether
someone is liable for murdering with
the divine name or witchcraft (kishuf).
Rav Chagiz replies that the words you
send out are similar to an arrow you
shoot. Either way, you send the deadly
means by which the person dies. He
cleverly quotes the verse: “Their
tongue is a deadly arrow” (Jer. 9:7).
Rav Chaim Yosef David Azulai
(Chida, 18th cen., Israel; Devash Le-Fi,
mem, no. 5) agrees with Rav Chagiz’s
argument. However, he distinguishes
between types of murders. Chida
says that when someone invokes the
divine name, that causes death unless
there is divine intervention to prevent
the death from happening. When the
intervention is lacking, the person
who invoked the divine name directly
causes the death. This is distinct from
another form of supernatural murder.
The Gemara (Shabbos 33b) tells the
story of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai’s
(Rashbi) exit from the cave in which
he hid for many years. After all that
time of constant Torah study, he was
shocked to see a Jew work. In his
disappointment, Rashbi looked at the
man with a devastating stare, causing
him to die. Not everyone reads that
story literally but Chida does.

Chida suggests that killing someone
by looking at him–without saying
anything–is different from invoking
G-d’s name for murder. Someone who
just stares in that way only intends to
draw out the holiness from within the
victim, leaving him empty of sanctity
which causes death. This is exempt
from human punishment because he did
not intend to kill anyone, only to draw
out the holiness. Alternatively, someone
who stares in that way only intends
to invoke divine judgment – if the
person deserves punishment of death
then that divine punishment should
be forthcoming immediately. In other
words, staring in that way is not a call for
murder but a call for divine judgment,
letting G-d decide the victim’s fate.
In contrast, someone who invokes the
divine name commits a direct act of
murder for which he is liable.
However, Rav Chaim Palaggi (19th
cen., Turkey; Responsa Lev Chaim,
vol. 2 Orach Chaim no. 188) disagrees.
He claims that no one who kills
in a supernatural way is liable for
punishment. In such cases, G-d kills; not
the person. Murder is the cessation of a
life within natural means. A miraculous
murder is out of human hands. When
someone extinguishes a fire with the
divine name, he is really asking G-d
to extinguish the fire indirectly. As

Rav Palaggi puts it, this is gerama di-
gerama, doubly indirect causation.

Similarly, when someone kills with
the divine name, he is causing death
through doubly indirect causation, for
which he is not liable.
It seems that Rav Ahron Soloveichik
would agree, to some extent, with Rav
Chaim Palaggi that killing with the
divine name is only indirect causation.
Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik would
agree with Rav Yisrael Ya’akov Chagiz
and Chida that killing with the divine
name is a direct act for which someone
would be liable.