27 Jan LAWS OF THE GPS APPLICATION
A GPS application
that includes an
option to alert
users to the
presence of police
should not make
use of that option.
The poskim discuss whether it is permitted
to report to the police a driver who is
traveling at excessive speed and thereby
endangering the public. The basis of the
discussion is found in the ruling of the
Rema (C. M. 425:1 and 388:12), who
writes that one who endangers the public
has the status of a rodef (pursuer), and it is
therefore permitted to hand him over to the
authorities.
Among contemporary halachic authorities,
we find that reckless driving has likewise
been viewed as a case akin to that of a
rodef. Thus, the Minchat Yitzchak (vol. 8,
siman 148) rules that one who drives
carelessly and in a reckless manner may be
reported to the authorities, though he adds
that one should first warn him. Similarly,
Teshuvot VeHanhagot (vol. 1, siman 450)
writes that one who drives at excessive
speed and may cause loss of life is
considered a rodef, and may be reported
even if he is likely to receive a severe
punishment, such as imprisonment, since
doing so constitutes a mitzvah of saving
human life.
We also find in Yechaveh Da’at (vol. 4,
siman 60) that Rabbi Ovadia Yosef ruled
that one should report to the authorities a
person seeking to obtain a driver’s license
who suffers from a latent medical condition
not readily apparent, which poses a danger
to the public, such as epilepsy. The same is
written in Chemdat Tzvi (vol. 3, siman 31).
From all this we derive permission and
even an obligation to report a driver who
endangers the public, all the more so may
one not assist him. Therefore, alerting
drivers through Waze or similar
applications to the presence of police,
when the purpose of the alert is to enable
reckless driving without being stopped by
law enforcement, constitutes assisting in
wrongdoing and
endangering the
public. It is therefore
certainly prohibited.
It is permitted to use a
GPS in which a
woman’s voice is
heard.
Since this is not the
voice of a living person
but rather a recorded
voice and merely a
vocal simulation, there
is no prohibition
involved. Moreover, according to halachic
ruling, there is no prohibition in hearing
the voice of a woman whom one does not
know, as Rabbi Ovadia Yosef elaborated at
length (Yabia Omer, vol. 1, siman 6). In
addition, this is not a singing voice but
simple speech intended solely for guidance
and direction.
Nevertheless, if this causes a person
discomfort or interferes with his
concentration, it is appropriate to change
the setting to a male voice or to turn off
the voice altogether.
Waze (GPS) that asks whether the user is
the driver, it is permitted to answer that he
is not the driver, provided he is absolutely
certain that doing so does not endanger
anyone. Nevertheless, it is proper to
refrain from saying so.
Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu was asked (in the
Olam Katan bulletin) whether it is
permitted to lie to Waze when it asks if I
am the driver and to answer that I am not
the driver. He replied as follows: “It is
forbidden to lie because of the lie itself. It
is forbidden to lie to ‘Waze,’ forbidden to
lie to a computer, forbidden to lie on the
internet, forbidden to lie to yourself. This
is not because of the other party—it is
because of you. Do not train yourself to
lie.”
Indeed, after analyzing the law, we can
conclude that there is room for leniency:
the primary prohibition of lying is derived
from the pasuk (Shemot 23:7), “Keep far
from a false matter,” and from the verse
(Vayikra 19:11), “You shall not lie, each
man to his fellow”. Those were stated
only with regard to a court of law, as
brought by the Rambam in Sefer
HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment
281), and it does not appear explicitly
elsewhere in the Rambam’s halachic
rulings. In Hilchot De’ot (5:7), the
Rambam wrote that a Torah scholar should
not alter his speech, implying that this
standard applies specifically to a Torah
scholar. This understanding also emerges
from the words of Sefer HaChinuch
(mitzvah 74).
Along these lines, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky
wrote (in Masechet Kutim note lamed),
proving from the Gemara in Shevuot (31a)
that the above psukim refer to judicial
proceedings and monetary testimony.
One should not argue that since no
falsehood is uttered verbally when one
responds to waze by pressing a button,
there is no prohibition of falsehood, for
even a falsehood that is evident through
one’s actions is forbidden, as derived from
the Gemara (Shvuot 31a): “From where do
we know regarding a student whose teacher
said to him: ‘You know about me that if
they were to give me one hundred maneh I
would not fabricate. I have one witness;
come, stand there and say nothing,’ for
although he does not utter a falsehood with
his mouth, it is nevertheless forbidden
because it says, ‘Keep far from a false
matter.’” However, these matters as well
were stated only with respect to a court of
law.
All of this, however, applies only when the
matter can cause harm to others, as stated
by the Yere’im (siman 235), who wrote
that the Torah did not warn against a
falsehood that does not lead to harm—this
is learned from the context, for the pasuk
speaks of one who causes harm to others.
Accordingly, there is certainly no Torah
prohibition to lie to Waze in a case where it
does not endanger others.