13 Jan MY INDEPENDENCE FROM YOU

I. The Illusion of a
Free Gift
There is a fairly
common practice for
charity organizations
to send people free
gifts—calendars,
books, Chanukah candles—and expect
a donation in return. If you receive such
a gift, are you required to respond with a
donation? This sounds like a very specific
question but it really addresses something
much bigger. Can someone obligate you?
Can someone, without your consent, force
you to respond in a certain way?
I am stubbornly independent. I do not like
the thought of someone else controlling
me, forcing me to take certain actions.
However, it happens more often than we
acknowledge. Consider a standard present
given for a birthday, a wedding or any
other event. A true gift comes free from
any obligation in response. Yet we are
expected to at least express thanks and
often to reciprocate with a gift in return
at the proper time, maybe even outdo the
gift given to us. What gives someone else,
whether family or friend, the right to force
us to take specific actions?

Apparently there has been a practice of
an author sending a copy of a book to
specific people and asking them to send
back payment for the book. The recipient
did not ask for the book. Rather than try
to convince someone to buy the book, the
author sends it unsolicited with a request
for payment. Halakhic authorities discuss
what to do in such a situation.
II. Financial Coercion and Unsolicited
Transactions
The Gemara (Bava Kamma 62a)
distinguishes between a robber (gazlan)
and a coercer (chamsan). A robber takes an
object without paying. A coercer takes the
object and pays, i.e. he forces you to sell.
Rav Ya’akov Yeshayahu Blau (20th cen.,
Israel) applies this category of coercion not
only to someone who forces you to sell an
object but also to someone who forces you
to buy something (Pischei Choshen, vol.
5, ch. 1, n. 26). Both are acts of financial
coercion. Any time you put someone in a
position in which he feels compelled to
buy, you have violated this prohibition.
Rav Blau’s primary example is an author
who sends you a copy of his book expecting
payment. He recommends that someone
who engages in this type of solicitation

include a note saying that payment is not
required, even though this might still make
recipients feel uncomfortable.
What do you do if you receive such a book
with an explicit demand for payment and
you do not want to pay for it? If the author
does not explicitly ask for payment, Rav
Blau writes that you can assume he sent it
as a gift. If he explicitly asks for payment,
then if you can without opening the
package, simply write “return to sender”
and return it in the mail. However, if you
open the package, rendering this option
untenable, then you are not obligated to
use your time and money to return the
book. However, you are not allowed to
use the book without payment. Rather,
you should identify the book as not yours
and set it aside for non-use. After a large
amount of time, if the author does not ask
you again for a payment then presumably
he has forgiven payment and you may use
the book.
Similarly, Rav Ya’akov Skoczylas
(cont., Israel) posed this question to Rav
Avigdor Nebenzahl (cont., Israel) who
responded that if an author sends you a
book unsolicited with an explicit request
for payment, you have three options: you
must either return it, pay for it, or set it
aside and remove it from use (Responsa
Mi-Tziyon Teitzei Torah, no. 547).
The story is told that Rav Ya’akov Yisrael
Kanievsky (Steipler Gaon; 20th cen.,
Israel) did not always reply to letters sent
to him, even if a stamped return envelope
was included. He would not even send
back the empty stamped envelope because
another person could not “coerce” Rav
Kanievsky’s time by forcing him to reply
or even send back the envelope. Rather,
if the sender ever came to ask for his
stamped envelope, Rav Kanievsky would

then pay him for it (Peninei Rabbeinu Ha-
Kehillos Ya’akov, vol. 2, p. 58, quoted in

Rav Ya’akov Yitzchak Fuchs, Halikhos
Bein Adam Le-Chaveiro, ch. 15 n. 18).
Rav Kanievsky is similarly quoted as
saying that if an author sends you an
unsolicited book asking for payment, you
should set the book aside for permanent
non-use (Orechos Rabbeinu, vol. 1, p.
281 and vol. 4, p. 225 in the name of his
son, Rav Chaim Kanievsky, both quoted
in Responsa Mi-Tziyon Teitzei Torah, no.
547 n. 370).
III. Consent and the Limits of
Obligation
In other words, you cannot use something
explicitly for sale without paying for it. On
the flip side, a seller cannot obligate you
without your consent. I believe that this
idea that another person cannot obligate
you is found in a somewhat comparable
Talmudic case.

The Gemara (Bava Metzi’a 101a) says
that if someone enters your field without
permission and plants there, you are
obligated to pay the lowest amount
someone would pay for that service. This is
astounding. Someone can force his services
on you and you are obligated to pay for it.
Granted, you pay the lowest amount, but
you still have to pay. This is not the end of
the story.
The Gemara proceeds so that there are
three types of scenarios, summarized in
Shulchan Arukh (Choshen Mishpat 375:1-
3):
1) A field that is intended to be planted and
the owner wants, expects and profits from
the planting. He has to pay the going rate
for the coerced services. (The owner wants
the planting lechatchilah.)
2) A field that is not intended to be planted
but the owner still wants and profits from
the planting. He has to pay minimally for
the coerced services. (The owner wants the
planting bedi’eved.)
3) An owner who does not want the
planting. He can tell the coercer to remove
the plants from his field. (The owner does
not want the planting at all.)
It turns out that this case does not quite
show that someone can obligate you
without your desire. You can reject his
assistance and not pay him. A person cannot
manufacture obligation by placing another
in an awkward or pressured position.
Whether through unsolicited books,
stamped envelopes or forced generosity,
obligation requires consent. Even the case
of the planted field does not undermine
this principle; payment is required only
where benefit is welcomed, whether from
the outset or after the fact. Where benefit is
rejected, obligation disappears. There is no
such thing as a halakhic free lunch but if you
do not want to be obligated to another, you
can choose not to eat that lunch. Halakhah
insists on a moral economy grounded not in
pressure, but in choice.