18 Nov PARSHAS TOLDOS: SELLING MITZVOS AND AVEIROS

And Yaakov said, sell
to me as of today, your
birthright. Bereishis
25:31
Sources that a Person
Can Sell Mitzvos and
their Reward
The Gemara (Menachos
72b) teaches that if two kohanim receive
portions of a korban containing equivalent
amounts of meat and bread, they are not
permitted to trade the meat for the bread or
vice versa. This is based on the pasuk (Vayikra
7:10) that all of the menachos should be
divided “ish k’achiv,” a man like his brother,
with equal portions to all. Tosafos Yeshanim
(Kiddushin 52b) writes that although a kohen
is not permitted to trade or give away his
portion of a korban, he is permitted to sell it to
a different kohen. The Avnei Neizer
(Kiddushin 451) explains that although the
kohen has the right to eat the korban, he does
not own it and as such there are limits to how
he can use or share it. There is a special
halacha that a kohen cannot trade or give
away a portion, but he can sell it.
This comment of the Tosafos Yeshanim, that a
person can sell the opportunity to fulfill the
mitzvah of eating korbanos, implies that a
person has the right to sell any mitzvah.

Similarly, the Shiltei HaGiborim (Bava
Kamma 32b, 3) writes that a person can sell an
aliyah that he is entitled to. Moreover, the
Gemara (Bava Kamma 91b) rules that if a
person is about to perform the mitzvah of
kisui hadam, and a second person jumps in
front of him and fulfills the mitzvah, the
person is considered to have stolen a mitzvah
and is obligated to pay ten gold coins in
restitution. We see that it is possible to place a
monetary value on a mitzvah, lending support
to the idea that mitzvos can be bought and
sold. However, the Shiltei HaGiborim adds
that a person can only sell a mitzvah before he
fulfills it. Once he has already performed the
mitzvah, he can no longer sell it to another in
order to retroactively make it as if the other
person fulfilled the mitzvah.
There is also an oft-repeated story about the
Vilna Gaon (see, for example, the seforim
Pinos Habayis, Divrei Eliyahu, and Shalmei
Todah), which implies that a person can sell
the reward of a mitzvah. It is recounted that
the Vilna Gaon once sent an emissary to
purchase an esrog on his behalf. After finally
finding a beautiful esrog, the buyer informed
the seller that his esrog would be used by the
famous Gaon of Vilna. Upon hearing this, the
seller declared that he would only agree to sell
the esrog if, in turn, the Gra agreed that all the

reward he would otherwise have received for
performing the mitzvah would be transferred
to the seller. Left with no other option, the
agent agreed to the terms. When he heard
about the agreement, the Gaon was overjoyed.
He explained that he always longed to serve
Hashem completely lishma but never reached
that level since he always knew that he would
later receive reward for performing the
mitzvos. Now he finally had the opportunity
to fulfill a mitzvah, purely lishma, with no
expectation of reward, as all reward for the
mitzvah had been transferred to the seller of
the esrog.
Sources that a Person Cannot Sell Mitzvos
and their Reward
Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin (the Netziv)
addresses the issue of selling mitzvos and
aveiros. However, before delving into the
technical and halachic aspects of selling
mitzvos and their rewards, the Netziv (Meishiv
Davar 3:14) emphasizes that it is highly
improper and contrary to the spirit of the
Torah for someone to sell his mitzvos. He
draws a parallel to Eisav, who “disgraced” his
birthright, highlighting that such behavior is
reflective of a negative attitude toward the
sanctity and value of mitzvos.
At first, the Netziv raises the possibility of
distinguishing between the reward for talmud
Torah and the reward for performing
mitzvos. When a person fulfills a mitzvah, he
acquires a portion of spiritual pleasure in the
World to Come, which is something that all
people have the capacity to enjoy. Thus, we
can imagine a person being able sell or give
this reward to another person. However, the
reward for talmud Torah also grants entry
into the Yeshiva Shel Ma’alah, a privilege
that can only be attained by someone who
has personally engaged in Torah study and,
therefore, cannot be transferred to another.
Ultimately, the Netziv concludes that it is not
possible to sell the reward for learning Torah
or fulfilling mitzvos. First, the reward for
mitzvos is a davar shelo ba l’olam, something
that does not yet exist, which is not subject to
a kinyan even for a tangible object. Second,
the reward in olam haba is not physical, and,
therefore, cannot be bought or sold.
Rav Shlomo Kluger (Tuv Taam VaDa’as
1:217) offers a rationale to distinguish
between the reward for Torah learning and
the reward for fulfilling mitzvos, proposing a
view opposite to that of the Netziv. When a
person performs a mitzvah, he deserves a
reward, and Hashem will give it to him, but
the person does not own it.
As such, he does not have the ability to sell
it. On the other hand, the Gemara (Kiddushin
32b) teaches that when a person studies the
Torah, he acquires it, and it becomes his. As
such, he has the right to sell it or give it away
as he sees fit. This perspective can also
explain the Yissachar-Zevulun partnership,
in which one person agrees to support
someone learning Torah on condition that
they split the reward of his Torah study, as

codified in Shulchan
Aruch (Y.D. 246).
Selling Aveiros and
their Punishments
The Maharsham (3:151) records an incident in
his community when one person sold his
aveiros to another, meaning he paid him to
acquire and take away his aveiros. The
Maharsham first discusses this from a
technical perspective, writing that kinyan
kesef would not work in this situation. He
proves from Tosafos (Bava Basra 51a), that
kinyan kesef only works when the seller
receives the money from the one who acquires
the item. However, here it is the opposite with
the “seller” of the aveiros giving money to the
other person so that he will “acquire” them.
Therefore, he writes, that if such a transaction
is possible, they would have to use a different
form of kinyan, such as situmta with a
handshake or sudar with a handkerchief.
However, the Maharsham continues that the
entire idea of selling aveiros in a binding
transaction is not possible. He references
Hashem’s response to Moshe Rabbeinu
(Shemos 32:32-33) when Moshe attempts to
defend the Bnei Yisrael following the cheit
ha’eigel, saying “micheini na mi’sifricha —
Erase me from Your book.” Hashem answers
“mi asher chata li emcheh misifri — I will
erase those who sinned against Me.” The
Ramban (s.v. V’Attah) explains that Moshe
asked Hashem to punish him for the sins of the
Jewish people, and Hashem responded by
telling him that He will only punish those who
actually committed the aveirah, not one who
offers to take the punishment upon himself.
Similarly, the Rema (Y.D. 246:1) rules that
one who has already learned Torah does not
have the ability to sell the reward for that
learning, and just as reward cannot be
transferred, so too punishment cannot be
exchanged.
However, the Maharsham does develop an
idea that, based on arvus, the principle that we
are all responsible for the actions of one
another, a person can offer to take on
punishment in place of someone else.
However, the ultimate decision rests with
Hashem, who may choose to punish either the
person who committed the sin or the one
offering to take his place. As a result, any
agreement to transfer punishment cannot be
binding, since Hashem retains the final say in
how justice is administered, regardless of any
arrangement made between the parties
involved.
In conclusion, we note that while great poskim
discuss these matters and they are part of the
mesorah and halachic discourse, it is important
to remember that there are no shortcuts when
it comes to real achievements in life, and
certainly not in one’s spiritual growth. We are
given a certain amount of time in this world,
and we should use the precious opportunity to
serve HaKadosh Baruch Hu to the best of our
ability, and not look for gimmicks and tricks

to “buy” our way ahead.