06 Jan RETREATING DUE TO ANTISEMITISM
The recent worldwide
growth of open
antisemitism has
prompted many
Jews to hide their
identity. Out of fear
of harassment or
violence, many Jews
have started hiding their identity in public
outside their own neighborhoods. Men in
particular tuck in their tzitzis and wear hats
or caps instead of yarmulkes. This raises
questions both of whether this disguise is
permissible and whether it is advisable.
Assuming halachah permits hiding your
identity, we still need to ask whether it is the
wisest response to antisemitism. But before
we think about what will work, we need to
establish what is allowed.
Unsurprisingly, this issue arose for centuries
as Jews were persecuted. For example, pre-
Modern tax farmers often placed unfair,
excessive burdens on Jews. Can a Jew dress
like a gentile when the tax farmer visits in
order to avoid the extra tax burden? Often,
antisemitic road bandits would harm Jews—
killing the men and raping the women—rather
than just stealing from them. Can travelers
dress like gentiles to avoid the danger of
antisemitic violence?
I. Disguise in the Face of Danger
Rav Yisrael Isserlein (15th cen., Austria)
discusses a number of Talmudic precedents
(Terumas Ha-Deshen 1:197). The Gemara
(Avodah Zarah 18b) tells of R. Meir’s escape
from Romans. At one point, he pretended to
eat non-kosher food in order to save his life.
Rav Isserlein counters that perhaps R. Meir
pretended to be a non-observant Jew who eats
non-kosher.
Rav Yosef Kolon (Maharik; 15th cen., Italy)
quotes a Gemara (Chullin 6a) which says that
a man ate pork because he failed to wash his
hands before eating bread. Rashi (ad loc.)
Rashi explains that the man stayed at an
inn serving both Jews and gentiles; when
he neglected ritual washing, the innkeeper
assumed he was a gentile and served him
non-kosher food. Maharik asks how such a
mistake was possible if the man was wearing
distinctively Jewish clothing. He concludes
that it must be permissible for a Jew to dress
like a gentile, and that the Gemara criticizes
the man only for failing to wash, not for
failing to dress in a recognizably Jewish
manner (Responsa, no. 88).
Rav Shabsai Cohen (17th cen., Poland) quotes
his father as arguing, based on a midrash, that
the circumstances were a case of antisemitic
oppression, which is why the man dressed
like a gentile. This story only proves that
in the face of antisemitism, we do not have
to dress distinctly Jewish. It proves nothing
about normal circumstances (Shach, Yoreh
De’ah 178:4). Be that as it may, we see that it
is permissible to dress like a gentile to avoid
at least general antisemitism.
In discussing ways to avoid an anti-semitic
tax farmer, the Gemara (Bava Basra 113a)
says that you may not wear clothing that
contains a forbidden sha’atnez mixture in
order to avoid the extra tax. This might
imply that you are allowed to dress like
a gentile in order to pretend to be one, just
without sha’atnez. However, the Rosh (14th
cen., Germany-Spain) explains that the tax
farmer exempts clothes made from sha’atnez.
You are trying to avoid tax not by dressing
like a gentile but by pretending that all your
clothes are tax-exempt (Bava Kamma 10:11).
According to the Rosh, you cannot pretend
to be a gentile because that seems like a
rejection of Judaism.
Rav Isserlein counters that the Sefer Chasidim
(12th cen., Germany) permits Jews to dress
like gentiles in order to avoid harassment
(nos. 199-200). He explains that the Rosh was
discussing someone trying to avoid financial
harassment. To save money, a Jew may not
pretend he is a gentile. But if there is a life
threat, you are allowed to dress like a gentile
and pretend you are not Jewish. However,
you are not allowed to say that you are a
gentile because saying so is equivalent to
rejecting Judaism.
II. Religious Persecution
However, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 74a-b)
says that in a time of religious persecution,
a Jew may not even change his shoestrings
(sandal straps) to gentile shoestrings. If so,
how can he be allowed to dress fully like a
gentile to avoid harassment?
Rav Yosef Ibn Chabib (15th cen., Spain)
distinguishes between the object of the
decree. If there is a decree that a Jew
must dress like a gentile, then compliance
validates the persecution and constitutes
a Chillul Hashem, a desecration of G-d’s
name. In such a case, even minor customs
must be upheld at risk of life. However, if
the decree targets Jewish practice or Jewish
existence more broadly, then we may oppose
those decrees by dressing like a gentile
(Nimukei Yosef, Bava Kamma, 40a in the
Rif).
Rav Moshe Isserles (Rema; 16th cen.,
Poland) rules like Rav Isserlein, that you
may disguise yourself to save your life
but you may not verbally deny Judaism
(Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 177:2). In his
Darkei Moshe (Yoreh De’ah 157:6), Rema
notes a difference between the views of Rav
Isserlein and Rav Ibn Chabib. Rav Isserlein
limits disguise to situations where the Jew
will not be recognized; exposure would
not only endanger the individual but also
generate a Chillul Hashem by emboldening
persecutors. Rav Ibn Chabib, by contrast,
mentions the risk of recognition without
explicitly framing it in terms of Chillul
Hashem.
Rav Shabsai Cohen (Shach, Yoreh De’ah
157:17) reads Rav Ibn Chabib as agreeing
with Rav Isserlein, that he is concerned that
a person might be recognized and create
a Chillul Hashem. Note Rav Isserlein and
other’s use of the term Chillul Hashem does
not in any way diminish the sacred status
in Judaism of the victims of persecution.
Rather, it reflects the paradox that the same
act constitutes a Chillul Hashem by the
persecutors and a Kiddush Hashem by the
victims and martyrs. Of course, we would
prefer to have neither.
III. Two Models of Resistance
I may be overreaching but it seems to me that
Rav Isserles sees a fundamental difference
in how Rav Isserlein (Terumas Ha-Deshen)
and Rav Ibn Chabib (Nimmukei Yosef)
understand this prohibition. Rav Ibn Chabib
believes that in the face of antisemitism,
we must continue with integrity. We must
redouble our commitment and observe our
religion and even our minor customs when
they are attacked. Failing to do so is a Chillul
Hashem.
In contrast, Rav Isserlein believes the
prohibition is against giving the oppressors a
victory. If they succeed in forcing us to violate
our religion or our customs, or otherwise
oppressing us, that is a Chillul Hashem.
If a Jew goes into an area where Jews are
not allowed and the gentiles discover him,
according to Rav Ibn Chabib, he risks injury
or worse. It is best to avoid such a scenario for
obvious reasons. According to Rav Isserlein,
the Jew not only risks his life but also gives
the antisemites a victory, which is a Chillul
Hashem. Rav Cohen believes both Rav Ibn
Chabib agrees with this approach.
In practice, the two approaches largely
converge. When antisemites seek to harm
Jews, avoiding confrontation may be both
permitted and prudent. Adjusting your
appearance in hostile environments by
wearing a baseball cap or altering your travel
patterns can deny antisemites the outcome
they desire. Alternatively, you can travel
with a group that is too large to be harassed.
By contrast, deliberately entering dangerous
spaces as an individual or in small groups in
order to display Jewish identity or provoke
confrontation is not religious courage.
From this perspective, deliberately entering
dangerous spaces not only places your safety
into question, it risks giving the antisemites
a victory, which would be a Chillul Hashem.