20 Jul SAVING DAYLIGHT—OR SAVING LIVES? A HALACHIC PERSPECTIVE

As the debate over
making Daylight
Saving Time
permanent continues,
much of the
discussion in the
Jewish world has
focused on the burden it would place on
religious communities, particularly during the
winter months when sunrise would occur
later. Agudath Israel of America has expressed
concern that a later sunrise would significantly
delay the time for Shacharit, forcing many
working individuals to choose between
praying with a minyan and arriving at work
on time.
Supporters of permanent Daylight Saving
Time, however, point to a different set of
concerns. They argue that the biannual clock
changes themselves come with a measurable
human cost. Studies have associated the
transition to and from Daylight Saving Time
with an increase in traffic accidents, workplace
injuries, sleep deprivation, and even certain
cardiovascular events. According to this view,
eliminating the twice-yearly time change

would improve public safety, reduce fatigue-
related accidents, and spare millions of people

the disruption caused by abruptly shifting

their internal clocks.
How should these competing considerations
be weighed? On the one hand, preserving the
ability of the public to attend Shacharit with a
minyan is a significant Torah value. On the
other hand, if changing the clocks contributes
to preventable injuries and loss of life, the
Torah places the highest priority on protecting
human life and preventing danger. How
would halachah balance these values? In the
following discussion, we will examine the
principal arguments in favor of ending the
seasonal clock changes and consider how the
Torah’s concern for both spiritual obligations
and physical safety may guide our
understanding of this contemporary issue.
In addressing matters of danger and personal
safety, Chazal present two seemingly
conflicting approaches. On the one hand, they
repeatedly emphasize that a person must do
everything reasonably possible to avoid
danger, even when the risk appears remote.
The Torah commands us to safeguard our
lives, and Chazal teach that סכנתא חמירא
מאיסורא—we treat matters involving danger
even more stringently than matters involving
ritual prohibition. This fundamental principle
is known as pikuach nefesh. The preservation
of human life overrides virtually all of the

Torah’s commandments not only when a
person’s life is in immediate danger, but even
in cases of doubtful danger (safek pikuach
nefesh) and, in many instances, where the
danger is more remote, provided there is a
reasonable concern that life may be at risk.
On the other hand, Chazal also invoke the
,(116:6 Tehilim’” (ׁשֹוֵמֵר ְּפּ ָָתִאִים ה” pasuk
teaching that Hashem protects those who
engage in ordinary activities that carry only
minimal and commonly accepted risks. This
principle recognizes that life cannot be lived
without some degree of risk, and that not
every remote possibility of harm requires a
person to refrain from normal human conduct.
The challenge, therefore, lies in determining
where to draw the line. At what point does a
risk become significant enough that halachah
obligates us to avoid it, and when may one
rely on the principle of ה פתאים שומר ?‘This
question is central to many contemporary
issues involving public health and safety,
including the debate over Daylight Saving
Time.
The apparent contradiction is addressed by
the Mesillat Yesharim (Chapter 9). He
explains that while a person is obligated to
avoid dangers that are apparent and reasonably
foreseeable, the Torah does not require one to
refrain from ordinary activities merely
because they involve some remote possibility
of harm. Since it is impossible to live in this
world without encountering a certain degree
of risk, one must take appropriate precautions
where necessary, but may otherwise conduct
himself in the normal manner of society
while placing his trust in Hashem. Thus, the
principle of ה פתאים שומר applies to ordinary,
commonly accepted risks, whereas one may
not rely on it to ignore a genuine or
significant danger.
The Poskim further developed this principle,
each offering a slightly different framework
for determining when one must avoid danger
and when one may rely on the principle of
.‘שומר פתאים ה
1. Immediate versus potential danger: The
Binyan Tzion (134) and Mishneh Halachot
(5:144) distinguish between an immediate,
present danger—which one is obligated to
avoid—and a potential or future danger,
where one may, under appropriate
.שומר פתאים ה on rely ,circumstances
Nevertheless, if the potential danger is
common or likely to occur, one may no
longer rely on this principle and must take
appropriate precautions. Rabbi Elchanan
Wasserman explains that the Torah does not
require a person to withdraw from ordinary
life because of every remote possibility of
danger. When the risk is neither immediate
nor tangible and is part of normal human
activity, one may follow the majority.
2. The public’s perception of danger: Rabbi

Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo
2:37:59) suggests that society’s perception of
risk plays an important role. If most people
regard a particular activity as dangerous and
avoid it, Halachah likewise considers it a
genuine danger that requires precaution.
Conversely, if an activity is widely accepted
as safe and people do not ordinarily avoid it, it
is generally not classified as a halachic danger.
He illustrates this principle with the case of
routine smallpox vaccination. Although
vaccination carries a slight risk, one may not
violate Shabbat in order to receive it, since the

danger is not regarded as immediate or life-
threatening. Because the public generally

perceives the risk as minimal and accepts it as
part of normal medical practice, it is not
classified as a halachic danger that warrants
overriding Shabbat.
3. Remote or speculative danger: Rabbi
Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim
2:111) rules that one may engage in normal
activities when the danger is only slight,
unlikely, or merely a possibility.
In summary, based on the approaches
discussed above, one could argue that the
increased risk of accidents attributed to
fatigue following the seasonal clock changes
does not constitute an immediate or likely
danger. Rather, it represents a potential and
relatively remote risk affecting only a small
percentage of those exposed. Hence such a
risk generally falls within the category in
which one may rely on the principle of שומר
ה פתאים‘, and it does not necessarily obligate
society to alter its normal course of conduct.
Accordingly, there is room to argue that
preserving a winter schedule that allows the
public to attend Shacharit at a reasonable hour
should take precedence over changing the
clocks solely to reduce a speculative increase
in fatigue-related accidents.
Of course, this conclusion depends upon the
assumption that the increased accident rate
remains relatively small and does not rise to
the level of a significant or commonly
occurring danger. Should future evidence
demonstrate that the clock changes create a
substantial and well-established threat to
human life, the halachic analysis would
require renewed consideration in light of the
Torah’s paramount concern for the
preservation of life.