10 Sep TESHUVAH AND REPAYMENT

Teshuvah, repentance,
is about returning to G-d
after sin. However, it is
not enough to change
yourself. You also have
to attempt to undo your
sin, to fix what you broke.
“And he shall return what
he stole” (Lev. 5:23) is a general rule that
you must restore your victim to wholeness.
Rambam asks, “And what is this teshuvah?”
after which he explains it at length (Mishneh
Torah, Hilchos Teshuvah 2:2). But then
Rambam adds that the teshuvah process he
describes only refers to sins between man
and G-d. When the sin is toward another
person, you are not forgiven until you give to
that person what you owe him and apologize
(ibid., 9). But do you actually have to pay him
in order to repent?
I. Commitment to Repay
Rav Ya’akov Emden (18th cen., Germany)
was asked about a man who ran away with
another man’s wife and money. The victim
of this crime was left a broken man and
eventually died. The new couple eventually
wanted to settle in a Jewish community. The
question, in part, was what this man has to do
in order to return to the status of a community
member in good standing. Rav Moshe Chagiz
was asked this question and he sent it to other
great rabbis of his time. He published their

answers in his Responsa Shtei Ha-Lechem
(no. 31). Rav Ya’akov Emden sent the longest
response, also published in his She’eilas
Ya’abetz (vol. 1, no. 79). Among other things,
Rav Emden requires the sinner to apologize
to the deceased’s family and at his grave,
and to return to the family the money he
stole. However, Rav Emden acknowledges
that this might not be possible due to lack
of funds. He argues that as long as the man
commits to paying back the money to the best
of his ability, he has fulfilled this particular
requirement for teshuvah.
Rav Emden offers a proof from the Gemara
(Kiddushin 49b) that if a man who is known
to be wicked betroths a woman on condition
that he is righteous, the betrothal is effective
(out of doubt) because he might have
repented in his heart. Commentators ask
many questions about this. Rav Emden infers
from this Gemara that even if a man does
not undo the harm he caused, even if he has
not yet returned the object he stole, once he
commits in his heart to do so he is considered
righteous. Surprisingly, Rav Emden does not
quote the earlier literature on this subject.
On the halachah of betrothing a woman on
condition that one is righteous, Rav Yosef
Karo (Beis Yosef, Even Ha-Ezer 38) quotes
Rabbeinu Yerucham who lists two views on
the subject. Prof. Nachum Rakover (Takanas
Ha-Shavim, p. 347) later filled in that these

two views are from Rabbeinu Tam (Sefer Ha-
Yashar, no. 140) and the Rosh (Sanhedrin,

ch. 3, no. 10; Responsa, 45:3). According
to the Rosh (14th cen., Germany-Spain), a
thief does not become qualified to testify
as a witness until he repents and pays back
the money. According to Rabbeinu Tam
(12th cen., France), as long as he commits to
repay the money, he can serve as a witness.
Rabbeinu Yerucham explains that the Rosh
must read the Gemara as excluding someone
who committed an interpersonal sin because
he still has to return the stolen object. In
contrast, according to Rabbeinu Tam even a
thief who betroths a woman on condition that
he is righteous is betrothed because if in his
heart he repented and committed to repaying
his theft, that alone suffices. It seems that
Rav Emden assumes that Rabbeinu Tam is
correct.
II. Requirement to Repay
Rav Meir (Maharam) of Lublin (17th cen.,
Poland) was asked about a man who served
as a witness on many divorce documents.
It was revealed that decades earlier he had
been caught stealing. Does that invalidate
every divorce on which he signed (Responsa
Maharam Lublin, no. 81)? Think of the
havoc that this would cause. Any woman
who remarried would have to divorce her
new husband and any children to whom she
gave birth would be declared illegitimate.
Maharam Lublin finds a number of reasons
for leniency. Among them is the common
practice for a rabbi arranging a divorce to
instruct the witnesses to do teshuvah for
all their sins before signing the document.
Maharam Lublin quotes the Rosh and others
that this would not work if a thief has not
yet returned the stolen object. Additionally,
it does not necessarily achieve atonement,
which might require fasting and other
acts of penance. However, in his case, the
stolen money had been found and returned
to the victim. Therefore, when the thief
presumably repented before signing the
divorce document, that suffices to qualify
him as a witness. This was one of Maharam
Lublin’s considerations in ruling leniently.
III. Other Prooftexts
Rav Moshe di Trani (Mabit; 16th cen.,
Israel) follows Rabbeinu Tam also. In his
Beis Elokim (Sha’ar Ha-Teshuvah, ch.
2), Mabit says that a thief is considered
repentant as long as he decides in his
heart — before G-d — that he will repay
the victim. As proof, he quotes the Gemara
about betrothal mentioned above. He also
quotes a Gemara (Bava Metzi’a 62a) that if
a father leaves in his inheritance something
stolen, the sons must return it to its original
owner. While technically they do not have
to do so, they must out of respect for their
father. But, asks the Gemara, are they really
obligated to show respect to their sinful
father? Rather, he must have repented from
his sin but died before he could return the

stolen item. Mabit asks that if repentance is
only effective if you repay the victim, then
how could the father be considered repentant
without returning the stolen item? Rather,
concludes Mabit, a commitment to return
the stolen object suffices and the father is
considered righteous and worthy of respect.
Rav Chaim Yosef David Azulai (Chida; 18th
cen., Israel) quotes some of the literature on
the subject and attempts to respond to proofs
in each direction (Tov Ayin, no. 6). We already
responded to the proof regarding betrothal —
that it does not refer to interpersonal sins.
Chida responds to the stolen inheritance
proof by arguing that death is different. He
does not elaborate but we can suggest that a
sinner must do everything humanly possible
to correct the damage caused by his sins.
Wanting to repay, even sincerely committing
to do so, is not sufficient. Find the money
and make it happen. However, the finality
of death removes all options. Death is much
more than a temporary obstacle. Therefore, a
repentant father who died before returning a
stolen object can be considered righteous but
anyone else must fulfill his commitment to
repay the victim.
Chida quotes another potential proof text
that he saw someone quote. The Gemara
(Berachos 19a) says that if you see a Torah
scholar sin during the day, you can assume
that he repented by nighttime. However, adds
the Gemara, that does not apply to monetary
sins because he still has to repay the damage
he caused. This text seems to imply that
repentance does not work if you still owe the
victim money, a proof for the Rosh. Chida
replies that we are discussing what one can
assume about a Torah scholar. If he did not
repay the damage then there is less of a basis
to assume he has repented. The text makes
no claim about when repentance is possible
rather it discusses only what an observer can
assume.
When we wrong someone else, we need to
do more than just teshuvah. Yes, we must
change ourselves, raise our religious status.
However, when there is a victim involved,
we must also restore his loss and apologize
to him. If we cannot repay him, we must
commit ourselves to attempting to do so.
Even then, it is a matter of debate whether
the commitment is enough. Our actions have
consequences which, as responsible people,
we must accept and address.