10 Feb THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PAY SHUL DUES

I. Shul Sanctions
Shuls (synagogues)
need funding in
order to maintain
the building and
provide services to
members. This is
clear and obvious. It
is uncomfortable to talk about such matters
because we want to focus on religious
growth and higher ideals. However,
the reality in this world is that spiritual
sustenance requires physical sustenance
and G-d’s workers in this world need funds
in order to serve the community. Shuls
usually raise the necessary funds through
annual dues and fundraisers, sometimes
also through fees for specific services. What
if someone refuses to pay dues or contribute
financially in any other way? This is not an
uncommon occurrence in large communities
where some people bounce from shul to
shul without belonging to any. Is the shul
allowed to sanction someone who can pay
but refuses to do so?
Of course, the shul needs to take into account
financial ability. If someone cannot afford to
pay the annual dues, you dare not sanction

him for something outside his ability. Here
we are only referring to someone who can
pay but stubbornly refuses to do so.
While a sanction might be appropriate, how
far can it be taken? What if that sanction
conflicts with another obligation? A shul
can prevent someone who refuses to pay
dues from leading the prayers and being
called up to the Torah. But what if he is the
only kohen on a day with Torah reading?
The halachah is that he must be called up
for the first aliyah. Does the sanction take
precedence over the obligation and allow
the congregation to bypass the kohen?
II. Not Being Called to the Torah
Rav Ya’akov Ariel (cont., Israel) cites

the Beis Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 345, s.v. Ve-
hem she-porkim) who quotes a debate

over whether a person who fails to pay his
Jewish community tax constitutes someone
who disassociates from the community
(poresh mi-darkei tzibur), which is very
severe, or merely someone who steals from
the community. Either way, it is a serious

transgression that merits sanction (Be-
Ohalah Shel Torah, vol. 7, no. 22).

The Gemara (Gittin 59b) says that we allow

a kohen to go first because
of the verse “ve-kidashto,
and you shall sanctify him”
(Lev. 21:8) and for the sake of
peace (mipnei darkei shalom).
How can it be both? R. Asher
ben Yechiel (Rosh; 14th cen.,
Germany-Spain) explains that
the verse is not quoted as a literal
obligation (it is an asmachta)
and the actual obligation is
rabbinic for the sake of peace
(Rosh, Chullin 6:9). However,
Rambam (12th cen., Egypt) understands
the verse as an actual obligation (Mishneh
Torah, Hilchos Klei Ha-Mikdash 4:2). Rav
Ariel explains that according to Rambam,
there is a biblical obligation to honor a
kohen by calling him to the Torah first but
he may waive the honor. For the sake of
peace, there is a rabbinic enactment that he
may not waive that honor.
According to the Rosh, a kohen is called
to the Torah for the sake of peace. But
in the case of someone who refuses to
support the community when everyone
else does, calling him to the Torah would
only cause disruption. However, according
to the Rambam, it is hard to argue that the
community has a right to waive his honor.
Perhaps, Rav Ariel suggests, we can
say that a kohen who by his own actions
knowingly invites disgrace on himself
when called to the Torah first, he has
shown disrespect for his status as a kohen
and therefore loses the honor. But that is a
bit of a stretch.
Rav Ariel adds another consideration. A
kohen who fails to pay for the maintenance
of the shul and its Torah scrolls shows by
his actions that he does not believe there is
a need for the prayers or Torah reading. A
person who obstinately refuses to support
an institution denies its religious value.
Honoring him with the very institution he
denies seems like a contradiction.
While Rav Ariel attempts to justify this
logical conclusion through prooftexts,
in my opinion he fails to build a solid
argument. I would take it in a different
direction and argue that, ultimately,
his basic premise suffices to justify the
conclusion.
III. The Free Rider Problem
Non-payment of shul dues is an example
of the “free rider problem” in economics.
Consider the case of public transportation.
If one person fails to pay for use, the transit
system does not suffer. But if too many
people refrain from paying, the system
suffers from lack of funds. One free rider
is not inherently a problem. Too many

free riders put the entire system at risk of
collapse.
Rav Aharon Levine (21st cen., US) quotes
a responsum of Rav Yair Chaim Bacharach
(17th cen., Germany) that analyzes a
specific case of the free rider problem.
A small community of 13 needed to hire
a shofar blower for Rosh Hashanah. Due
to the war-time circumstances, the shofar
blower demanded more than three times the
pay he had received in the previous year.
Seven members of the community opposed
hiring him and were content to miss shofar
that year due to the war. Six members
were willing to pay the exorbitant rate.
The willing members threatened that they
would instruct the shofar blower to have
in mind that those who did not pay would
not fulfill the mitzvah. Aside from the other
complicated elements of the question, Rav
Bacharach also examined whether this
condition was just (Chavos Ya’ir, no. 186).
Rav Bacharach distinguishes between
people who cannot afford to pay and those
who can but refuse to do so. Those who
cannot afford the high rate are not obligated
to contribute to the payment. Since their
non-payment does not reflect a failure to live
up to their obligation, they may not justly
be excluded from the mitzvah. They are not
free riders because they are not obligated to
pay. Those who can afford but refuse to do
so are shirking their obligation. Therefore,
they constitute free riders and may justly be
excluded from the mitzvah (Case Studies in
Jewish Business Ethics, p. 346). This is aside
from the question of whether the condition
works in this particular circumstance.
A community must be able to sanction its
free riders. Otherwise, the entire community
infrastructure is at risk of collapse. It is true
that such decisions must be made carefully
and compassionately, ensuring the dignity
of members who cannot afford to pay and
making room for them to thrive as full
members. That said, we still need to ensure
that those who can afford to support the
community do so. If we do not enforce our
community standards then we quickly will
no longer have a community or standards.