07 Jun THE DYNAMICS OF TORAH LAW: NAVIGATING MULTIPLE CORRECT ANSWERS

As preparation
for the Chag of
Shavuot, the
h o l i d a y
commemorating
the receiving of the
Torah, we would like to explore and delve
into some very important insights about
the essence of the Torah.
In the rich tradition of Jewish scholarship,
debates among rabbis are not just
common—they are essential. These
debates, especially those concerning
biblical laws and narratives, often leave
the uninitiated puzzled. How can multiple,
seemingly contradictory interpretations
all be considered correct? This article
delves into the fascinating dynamics of
Torah law, exploring how multiple truths
coexist within Halachic discourse and
Torah narratives, and how this plurality is
both intentional and foundational to
Jewish thought.
a. When two rabbis argue on a biblical
law, can we say that at least one is
mistaken, since the truth must be only
one?
Answer:
Both are correct.
When the Torah was given, Hashem
didn’t give conclusive laws to Moshe
Rabenu, but rather he gave him 49 ways
to explain one way and 49 ways to explain
the other. For example when dealing with
impurity- טומאה of certain creatures,
Chazal explain that some rabbis knew 49
ways to say it’s Tahor-pure although it is
clearly Tam’e. All those ways were valid
and acceptable because when the Torah
was given it was given with all those
options.
This obviously raises the question: what
should one do? What’s the final Halacha?
This question was resolved by the Torah
as well. The Torah teaches how to
determine the final Halacha on each
matter. At the Bet-Hamikdash there was a
place called Lishkat Hagazyit and there
the greatest rabbis would be learning and
investigating his Halacha matter in much
depth. All the rabbis then state their
opinions and they would be counted and
the majority of opinions of the Rabbis
would be the final Halacha.
See this in the Midrash (שוחר טוב תהלים יב(:
Rabbi Yannai said: “The words of Torah
were not given in definite matter, but
rather for every law Hashem said to
Moshe various ways to explain. For

example, there are 40 ways to render
something pure and 40 ways to render
impure. Moshe asked: “Master of the
Universe, until when will we deliberate
over the clarification of the law?” Hashem
replied: “After the majority, follow. If the
majority declares something impure, it is
impure; if the majority declares it pure, it
is pure.” Rabbi Abbahu, in the name of
Rabbi Yonathan, said: “Rabbi Akiva had a
proficient student who would render
something impure by the Torah law in one
context and purify it in another context.”
Another example to this is what the Ritva
(עירובין יג (explained. The Ritva asked
how is it possible that two Rabbis would
say differently and they both would be
right. Isn’t the truth supposed to be just
one? If one way is true then the other isn’t.
He answered that Hashem gave all options
thus they are all true, but the final Psak
should be decided by the rabbis of each
generation.
The Ritva writes:”These and those are the
words of the living G-d.” The sages of
France asked: “How is it possible for both
these and those to be the words of the
living G-d, while one is forbidding and
the other permitting?” They explained
that when Moshe ascended to receive the
Torah, they showed him forty-nine
reasons for prohibition and forty-nine
reasons for permission for every matter.
Moshe asked Hashem about this, and He
said that this should be entrusted to the
sages of Israel in every generation, and
the decision shall be according to their
judgment.
b. After explaining that in the laws of the
Torah there are different options which
are all valid, and the final Halacha should
be followed according to what the rabbis
instructed us. What about factual matters,
like for example a story that happened in
the Torah.
You surely can’t explain different
scenarios to a stories and claim that they
are all true.
How is it possible then that the Rabbis
argue of what have happened and still
consider them all right?
Answer:
All are valid as well.
There is a fascinating Gemara (גיטין ו,ב (
which tells us that Hashem himself agrees
with all opinions explaining stories of the
Torah: Rabbi Avitar encountered Eliyahu
and asked him, “What are you doing?”
Eliyahu replied, “I am involved with the

case of the concubine in Gibeah.” Rabbi
Avitar asked, “What does that mean?”
Eliyahu responded, “My son, this is what
Abitar says, and my son, this is what
Jonathan says.” Rabbi Avitar exclaimed,
“Heaven forbid! Is there uncertainty
before the Heavenly Court?” Eliyahu
replied, “These and those are the words of
the living G-d.”
This question was dealt by Rabenu Perets.
He explained that anything that can be
explained in a correct manner is
considered as well correct, even if
factually wrong and it also gets to be
called the words of G-D. He writes: ‘’its
difficult from events that took place in
reality, such as the altar [see Zevachim
31b], where one pasuk supports that it was
sixty cubits and another verse supports
that it was twenty. How can one say “these
and those are the words of the living G-d,”
since we cannot say that it followed the
majority of the sages of the generation, as
it was only in one matter? One could
argue that all of them were only in one
matter, but one verse supported one
ruling, and another verse supported
another ruling. The statement “these and
those are the words of the living G-d”
means that from the verses, there are
implications for interpretation, but
certainly, it was only in one matter.’’
מכתבים יצחק פחד) Hutner Yitschak Rav
(went further to explain that our Torah is
not a book of facts, but it’s a book of ideas
which are given to explore, and if one
says something that fits the text and isn’t
contradictive to the Halacha and Chazal
main understanding, those words are valid
and they shine special spiritual lights.
c. When a person learns the Torah and he
has an insight that came to his mind, is he
permitted to say it the way he understands
it, even though it’s not the way the rabbis
explained it and even contrary to the
Rabbis explanation?
Answer:
Yes.
This is one of the most fascinating ideas
in the special ways the Torah is studied.
One is permitted to say over his
independent ideas even though he is the
first to ever to say it or think about it, as
long as it’s not an Halachic matter (unless
he is a Posek) and as long as it’s not
against the basic rules of the Torah,
meaning it isn’t Kefira- heresy. There are
many sources to this concept and we’ll
just list a few. Rabbi Chaim Ben Atar says
החיים אור )

בראשית א,א אות ג):
‘’You should know that we have
permission to explain the implication of
the verses after careful study – even
though our conclusions differ from the
explanation of our Sages. That is because
there are 70 faces to the Torah. There is no
prohibition against differing from the
words of our
Sages except if it changes the Halacha.
Similarly, we find that even though the
Amoraim did not have the right to disagree
with the Tanaim in halachic matters – but
we find that they offered alternative
explanations to psukim’’
Ohr Hachayim writes again :(החיים אור
that idea same the) בראשית פרק מו פסוק ח
dont wonder whenever his interpretations
don’t align with our Sages explanation
since one is allowed to argue on our sages
and say he’s mind if it’s not lehalacha.
שלח פרשת צדיק) Hacohen Tsadok Rabbi
פרי (teaches that since there are 70 faces to
the Torah
All new explanations are valid:
The Ben Ish Chai brings that each person
has a part of the Torah that is designated
and independent just for him, and only he
can say that insights.
d. After explaining that the Torah was
given over with 49 ways to each side of
the coin,
Why did Chazal use different terminology
of 70 faces? Is it 49 or 70?
Answer:
The two terminologies speak about
different ideas.
We explained above that Hashem told
Moshe Rabenu 49 different ways to
explain the law in one way and 49 different
ways to explain it the other way. The 70
faces to the Torah on the other hand refer
to the different depth of understanding of
the Torah and different views and points
which explain each concept, as Rav
.explained מכתב מאליהו ח‘‘ג עמוד 202 Desler