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    The Force in Halacha

    As a thought experiment, I was wondering what Jewish law would say about Jedi powers. Of course, this is all fiction but theoretical exercises can also serve as Torah study. Is a Jedi obligated to use his Jedi powers to save others? Can he go on vacation or retire?

    The Torah (Vayikra 19:16) forbids bystanding, watching someone die without helping. “Do not stand by idly on your fellow’s blood” requires us to attempt to save someone in mortal danger. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 426:1) states:

    “One who sees his friend drowning in a see or bandits approaching him or a dangerous animal approaching him, and one can save him by himself or by hiring others to save, and did not save… and similar circumstances, violates ‘Do not stand idly by your fellow’s blood.’”

    Note that we are even required to spend our money to hire someone to save a person in danger. Money concerns should not stand in our way of saving someone’s life. But another consideration is notably missing. Neither Shulchan Aruch nor the Rosh or Tur say that we are obligated to endanger ourselves in order to rescue someone else. This is particularly interesting because the author of the Shulchan Aruch, in his earlier work Beis Yosef (ad loc.), quotes the Hagahos Maimoniyos who states that we must endure danger to save someone else.

    The Hagahos Maimoniyos quotes the Talmud Yerushalmi (Terumos 8:4) as his source for this obligation. The Yerushalmi tells of a time in which Rabbi Immi was imprisoned and presumably in mortal danger. Reish Lakish stated that he would charge the prison and either kill or be killed in his rescue attempt. (Note that Reish Lakish was a famous bandit before he underwent a religious transformation, so he was well trained for this attempt.)

    However, since the Shulchan Aruch and others do not follow his Yerushalmi, they must have had a reason. Generally speaking, we follow the conclusions of the Talmud Yerushalmi unless the Talmud Bavli disagrees. Because the Talmud Bavli was compiled approximately 150 years after the Talmud Yerushalmi, we assume its editors were aware of the Yerushalmi and only disagreed intentionally and conclusively. Therefore, commentators searched far and wide for passages in the Talmud Bavli that could be read as disagreeing with the above Yerushalmi.

    One of the passages quoted as indicating disagreement is about Rabbi Tarfon’s refusal to hide fugitives from the law (Nidah 61a). Accused murderers came to him, asking for sanctuary. He declined, saying that if they were guilty then he would also become guilty. Tosafos (ad loc., sv. Itmarinchu) quote the She’eiltos who explain Rabbi Tarfon’s refusal as a protective measure. He would not risk his life to save their lives. Some deduce from here that you are not obligated to risk your own life to save others.

    But to what extent? Any excursion into public entails some degree of risk. Driving a car is risky. Are you exempt from saving someone’s life because driving on the highway constitutes risking your life? On the other hand, overly risky behavior is suicidal. Firemen are trained not to run into a building about to collapse to save someone’s life because of the risk. What is the limit?

    A recent halachic guidebook for Hatzolah emergency volunteers, Hatzalah Ke-Halachah by R. Adi Cohen, surveys the opinions on this subject. For the author and readers of this book, this is a very relevant question whose answer has real implications for them and their families. When do Hatzolah volunteers refuse to enter a dangerous situation and when do they charge forward? Based on a responsum of the Radbaz (vol. 5, no. 218 (1,582)), contemporary authorities perceive a 50% threshold (e.g. Shevet Ha-Levi 8:87; Tzitz Eliezer 13:100:4). If the chance of survival is greater than 50%, then you are biblically obligated to try to save someone’s life despite the risk. That seems like a low threshold to me. On a personal level, I prefer a greater chance of survival than just 50%.

    Let us also consider the force choke. Wookiepedia (no, that is not a typo) defines a force choke as “a dark side Force power where one would strangle the victim with the Force. It was often performed with a grip-like gesture.”

    If a Jedi or Sith kills someone with a force choke, is he liable for execution? On the one hand, he directly caused a death and should be punished. On the other, I assume that any hand motions of a Jedi—the “grip-like gesture”—are unnecessary and that really Darth Vader can perform a force choke with his hands tied behind his back. If so, he technically committed no action. Can someone be executed for merely thinking about murder?

    There is precedent for this question in halachic literature. Authorities have discussed whether someone who kills by invoking God’s name is liable for murder. Tradition teaches that when Moshe saved an Israelite slave’s life by murdering the Egyptian taskmaster, he did so by invoking God’s name. If someone did that in a different situation that did not involve saving someone, would the murderer be held liable? The author of Responsa Halachos Ketanos (vol. 2, no. 98) argues that he is liable.

    The Chida (Devash Le-Fi, mem, no. 5) distinguishes between types of murders. The Gemara (Shabbos 33b) tells the story of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai’s (Rashbi) exit from the cave in which he hid for many years. After all that time of constant Torah study, he was shocked to see a Jew work. In his disappointment, Rashbi looked at the man with a devastating stare, causing him to die. Not everyone reads that story literally but the Chida does. He suggests that killing someone by looking at him–without saying anything–is different than invoking God’s name for murder. Someone who does the former is exempt from human punishment while someone who does the latter is liable.

    Rav Chaim Palaggi (Responsa Lev Chaim, vol. 2 Orach Chaim no. 188) argues that no one who kills in a supernatural way is liable for punishment. In such cases, God kills; not the person. Murder is the cessation of a life within natural means. A miraculous murder is out of human hands.

    If a force choke is comparable to killing silently, then perhaps the Halachos Ketanos would hold a Jedi liable for such a super murder. The Chida would seem to exempt him, as would Rav Chaim Palaggi. They would let Darth Vader get away with murder but that is not surprising because Jewish law has a very high bar for execution. Presumably, he would get punished by divine hands instead, in this world or the next.