14 Jan THE HALACHIC LESSONS OF A RAGING FIRE
As wildfires rage
across Los Ange-
les, leaving de-
struction in their
wake, the raw
power and unpre-
dictability of fire come to the forefront of
our minds. Fire, while a source of life and
warmth has the potential to become a
devastating force when it escapes control.
This dual nature of fire—both beneficial
and destructive—has long been a focus of
halachic analysis.
As we’ll see, the obligation for the damages
caused by fire lies upon the arsonist, as well
as the office of the LA governor, which
failed to make sure that measures were in
place to prevent and control the fire.
The Torah’s treatment of fire emphasizes
the responsibility of individuals to ensure
that their actions, even when seemingly
minor, do not lead to catastrophic harm.
Beyond its physical impact, fire serves as a
poignant metaphor for human
accountability: when kindled carelessly,
even the smallest spark can spiral into a
blaze of damage.
In halachic discussions, esh (fire) is
categorized as one of the primary forms of
mazik. The unique nature of esh lies in its
ability to spread and cause harm through
an external force, such as wind, while
originating from human action. The Torah
establishes liability for damages caused by
fire, as seen in the pasuk, “When a fire goes
out and finds thorns, consuming stacked
grain… the one who kindled the fire shall
make restitution” (Shemot 22:5). This
reflects the general principle that a person
bears responsibility for controlling their
fire and preventing it from causing harm.
The Gemara explains that the chidush
(novelty) in obligating the arsonist is that
fire does not have the ability to spread on
its own; rather, it requires a medium, such
as wind. One might think that merely
lighting a match in my house, which then
spreads to a neighbor’s house due to the
wind, would be beyond my responsibility.
However, the Gemara teaches that the
individual is still held accountable.
A significant debate regarding the nature
of liability for esh occurs between Rabbi
Yochanan and Reish Lakish (Baba Kama
22a).
• Rabbi Yochanan views esh as an
extension of the person who kindled
it, based on the concept of kocho
(one’s force). According to this
perspective, the damage caused by
fire is directly attributed to the
individual, as though the fire acts as
their agent. This framework
emphasizes personal responsibility
for initiating and managing the fire.
• Reish Lakish, however, understands
esh through the lens of mammono
(one’s property). He argues that fire is
akin to one’s possessions, such as an
animal or object that causes damage.
The liability stems from the person’s
failure to properly guard or control
their “property,” in this case, the fire.
This machloket has far-reaching
implications for the halachic parameters of
liability in cases where fire causes damage
indirectly or unintentionally. For example,
according to Rabbi Yochanan, liability
might extend further due to the personal
nature of kocho. In contrast, Reish
Lakish’s view, which ties liability to
the fire as property, may limit
responsibility to situations where
negligence in guarding the “property”
can be proven.
In the discussion in the Gemara, Rabbi
Yochanan appears to agree with Reish
Lakish that esh (fire) can also be
considered a liability as one’s property.
Consequently, Rabbi Yochanan holds
that there are two distinct reasons to
obligate the individual: one based on
their personal act (kocho), and the
other as their property (mammono).
The psak halacha in the Shulchan
Aruch (C.M. siman 418; 17) follows
Rabbi Yochanan’s view, establishing
liability for both reasons. This
conclusion implies that one who sets a
fire is obligated to pay not only for
property damage but also for injuries
caused to individuals.
When a person (Adam HaMazik)
causes injury to another, the Torah
obligates them to compensate the
victim through five categories of
payment (Chamisha Dvarim):
1. Nezek (Damage): Compensation
for the reduction in the victim’s
physical ability or value (e.g., loss of
earning potential).
2. Tza’ar (Pain): Payment for the
physical pain endured by the victim,
even if no financial loss occurred.
3. Ripui (Medical Expenses):
Reimbursement for the cost of
medical treatment required due to the
injury.
4. Shevet (Lost Wages): Compensation
for income lost while the victim is
unable to work during recovery.
5. Boshet (Embarrassment): Payment
for the humiliation caused to the
victim, evaluated based on the
circumstances and societal norms.
These categories reflect the multifaceted
nature of liability, addressing both tangible
and intangible harms. They apply to arson
as well, as arson is viewed as an extension
of the person’s actions, placing it under the
category of Adam HaMazik. Thus,
according to Rabbi Yochanan, the arsonist
is obligated to pay. However, according to
Reish Lakish, who holds that liability for
fire damages is based on mamon haMazik
(the person’s property that caused the
damage), only the first category, nezek
(damage), is applicable.
Even more severe, if a person dies as a
result of the fire, the arsonist is considered
a murderer and is subject to capital
punishment if the fire was set intentionally.
Due to the severity of the harm fire can
cause, the Gemara discusses at length the
precautions one must take, such as ensuring
that an oven is placed in a safe and secure
location to prevent a fire from starting. The
Aruch HaShulchan (C.M. siman 155; 2)
further emphasizes that the government
has an obligation to implement necessary
measures to prevent fires, making
government officials accountable if they
fail to fulfill their responsibilities in this
regard.