14 Jul THE INTERFERING RABBI

I. Secession and
Authority
On July 28, 1876
— 150 years ago
— the Prussian
parliament passed
a law allowing secession from a Jewish
community without formally renouncing
affiliation with Judaism. Rav Samson
Raphael Hirsch had lobbied heavily
for this law. Once secession became
legal, Rav Hirsch ruled that Orthodox
Jews in his city of Frankfurt am Main
were religiously obligated to secede
from the Reform-dominated Jewish
community and join his independent
Orthodox community. However, most
initially refused to do so. Seceding from
the long-standing Jewish community
carried large emotional costs, not least of
which was losing the opportunity to be
buried in the mainstream community’s
cemetery with their ancestors. Among
those who refused were some of the
most traditionally learned laymen in the
community.
Adding to Rav Hirsch’s frustration,
one of the leading Orthodox rabbis in
Germany publicly declared that people
were not obligated to secede from the
Frankfurt community. Rav Yitzchak Dov
(Seligmann Baer) Bamberger served as
rabbi of Wurzburg, rosh yeshiva there,
and founder of its teachers’ seminary. He
revived the yeshiva, previously led by
Rav Avraham Bing, and insisted, unlike
other German Torah institutions of the
time, that secular education could not
detract from the yeshiva’s schedule at all.
Generally, Rav Bamberger approved
of seceding from Reform-dominated
communities. However, as we shall see,
the specific circumstances in Frankfurt
led him to rule that people were not
obligated to secede, which he published
in the newspaper. This interference by
an outside rabbi greatly frustrated Rav
Hirsch, who responded with an open
letter chastising Rav Bamberger. Rav
Bamberger replied with an open letter,
and Rav Hirsch responded with a final,
lengthy one. All three are available in
volume 6 of Rav Hirsch’s collected
writings and have been discussed at
length by historians (e.g., Dr. Judith
Bleich, “The Frankfurt Secession
Controversy,” Jewish Action, Winter
1991-1992). I hope to examine the
substantive disagreements at a later
time; here I want to discuss one specific
halachic question: did Rav Bamberger
have the right to disagree with Rav
Hirsch?
II. After a Rabbi Forbids
Once Rav Hirsch ruled to forbid
membership in the Frankfurt community,
was any other rabbi allowed to permit
it? The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 7a) says:
“One who asks a sage and he rules that it
is forbidden, he may not ask another sage
who rules it is permitted.” As we will see,
the facts of this case render this question
irrelevant. Still, both parties debated it at
length, and it is worth examining their
arguments.
Toward the end of his first letter, Rav
Hirsch invoked this rule (Collected
Writings, vol. 6, p. 218). Rav Moshe
Isserles, in his gloss to Shulchan Aruch
(Yoreh De’ah 242:31), adds that another
rabbi may permit a prohibitive ruling
only if the first rabbi erred in basic
knowledge (devar Mishnah) or judgment
(shikul ha-da’as). Since Rav Bamberger
never attempted to show such an error,
Rav Hirsch argued he had no right to
contradict the local ruling.
Rav Bamberger should have simply
replied that the facts made the rule
irrelevant, as his son later said. Instead,
he argued the rule didn’t apply for other
reasons. Rav Shabsai Cohen quotes two
opinions on whether a greater rabbi may
permit what a lesser rabbi forbade (Shach,
Yoreh De’ah 242, Kitzur Hanhagos, par.
1) and, since this is a rabbinic matter,
rules leniently: “a rabbi of generally
recognized superior qualifications is not
bound to accept the ruling of a rabbi with
other qualifications if he is convinced
that the ruling of the latter is in error”
(Collected Writings, vol. 6, p. 233). Rav
Bamberger further noted that the Shach
requires the ruling to have been accepted
(chalah) and disseminated (nispashtah)
— and since Rav Hirsch’s ruling was
rejected by most of the community,
including its most learned members, it
never reached that threshold (ibid., pp.
234-235).
III. A Solid Ruling
From today’s vantage, it’s hard to believe
Rav Bamberger — now a footnote to
rabbinic history — claimed to be greater
than Rav Hirsch, still a household name.
But at the time, Rav Bamberger was a
leading halachic authority in Germany
and a major rosh yeshiva. Rav Hirsch
nonetheless took offense and responded
at length (fifteen pages in the English
edition, pp. 261-276).
Rav Hirsch made a few points. First,

the Shach meant only that
an unopposed ruling, once
issued, may not later be
disputed. Second, a real
gadol would be too humble
to claim the title. Third, the
two views on whether a
greater scholar may permit
what a lesser one forbade
track two rationales for the
prohibition itself: one holds
it disrespectful to contradict
a scholar who already ruled;
the other holds that the
questioner, in asking, implicitly vows to

follow the ruling (shavya chatichah de-
issura), rendering it forbidden regardless

of who later disagrees. Rav Hirsch
argued the majority follows the second
view, meaning a greater rabbi may not
overturn it, and that this obligation
operates on a biblical level, per the Pri
Megadim (Yoreh De’ah 1:39).
IV. Evaluation
Looking back a century and a half later, I
find this disagreement painful, and some
of its arguments forced. Rav Bamberger’s
point about acceptance and dissemination
seems valid: Rav David Segal makes a
similar point about a rabbi forbidding
what another already permitted (Taz,
Yoreh De’ah 242:18, quoted in Responsa
Zeicher Simcha, no. 230), and Rav Tzvi
Ashkenazi calls that reasoning “correct”
(Responsa Chacham Tzvi, no. 53). Rav
Shlomo Kluger argues Rav Isserles
would apply this only when the earlier
ruling was lenient, while the Shach
applies it even to strict rulings (Responsa
Tuv Ta’am Ve-Da’as, third recension,
vol. 2, no. 80). Rav Bamberger, then, had
ample support for his claim.
Rav Hirsch’s claim that the issue
is biblical rather than rabbinic also
seems debatable. His proof from the
Pri Megadim concerns someone who
explicitly says “this is forbidden,” a
stretch to apply to implicit acceptance of
a ruling. One contemporary work states
plainly that the matter is rabbinic and
should be decided leniently in cases of
doubt (Rav Aharon Aryeh Katz, Pesakim
U-Teshuvos, Yoreh De’ah 242:44). And
while it’s uncomfortable for one rabbi
to claim higher standing than another,
knowing one’s role in the community
matters; Rav Bamberger was, at the time,
the more established authority.
On the other hand, it is unseemly for
any rabbi to interfere in another’s
community affairs. Rav Hirsch worked
for years to change the law and build

a separate Orthodox community, and
Rav Bamberger’s interference caused
him real difficulty. Whether technically
permissible or not, there is a moral
failing here. But the actual course of
events makes the whole debate somewhat
beside the point.
V. Conclusion
As Rav Bamberger explained in his
first public statement, members of Rav
Hirsch’s circle asked him to speak with
the leading opponents of secession
to convince them that secession was
necessary. In that conversation, he
learned of the mainstream community’s
latest concessions, which essentially
gave the Orthodox community
everything it wanted, and this changed
his view. He could not, in good faith, tell
them they were obligated to secede. But
a newspaper incorrectly reported that he
had ruled secession forbidden, forcing
him to publicly clarify that his position
was only that it was not obligatory. He
had not set out to issue a contrary ruling,
but was drawn in and responded to local
circumstances. In hindsight, he might
have said less publicly, simply declining
to comment further.
This reminds me of Rav Moshe
Feinstein’s position on the Flatbush
eruv. In 1978, the Va’ad HaRabbonim
of Flatbush planned an eruv based on
a lenient ruling of Rav Menashe Klein.
Rav Feinstein told them he disagreed
but that they needn’t follow him. Yet,
once word incorrectly spread that he had
permitted the eruv, he felt compelled to
state unequivocally that he opposed it
(Iggeros Moshe, Orach Chaim, vol. 4,
no. 87).
To his credit, Rav Hirsch persevered,
and his independent Orthodox
community ultimately thrived, as much
of the Orthodox in the mainstream
community eventually seceded, with
the deep involvement of many of Rav
Bamberger’s own family members.