29 Aug UNCERTAINTY IN THE AI (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE) ERA: THE CHALLENGE OF “GUILTY BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT” PART 1
Consider a scenario
where an individual
is brought before a
court on suspicion
of grave offenses.
Incriminating actions
are captured in recorded
videos, seemingly providing concrete
evidence. However, the accused contests the
charges, admitting that they appear in the
video but asserting their innocence. Their
defense attorney raises a plausible argument,
suggesting that the images could be AI
(Artificial Intelligence) -generated, casting
doubt on the authenticity of the evidence.
In the realm of criminal justice, the phrase
“guilty beyond any reasonable doubt”
holds immense significance. It serves as a
cornerstone of the legal system, ensuring that
individuals accused of crimes are afforded
a fair trial and protection against wrongful
convictions. This principle sets a high
standard of proof that the prosecution must
meet to secure a conviction, emphasizing
the gravity of taking away a person’s liberty
based on evidence that leaves no room for
reasonable uncertainty.
In an era where AI apps can seamlessly
generate lifelike images and videos of
individuals purportedly engaging in criminal
activities, the reliability of visual evidence
has been called into question. These AI-
generated images and videos are often so
meticulously crafted that they can mirror
a person’s appearance and even replicate
their voice with astonishing accuracy. This
technological advancement raises concerns
about the potential for misinformation,
manipulation, and the erosion of trust in
visual evidence within legal proceedings.
The phrase “guilty beyond any reasonable
doubt” now faces a fresh dimension of
interpretation. As AI blurs the lines between
reality and fabrication, legal systems must
grapple with redefining what constitutes
reasonable doubt in the context of visual
evidence. The challenge lies in distinguishing
between authentic recordings and AI-
generated content, as well as determining the
origin and integrity of such evidence.
Convictions based on footage and videos.
The Torah’s stance on relying on footage or
videos for incrimination is subject to scrutiny.
The Talmud (דר״ה פ״ב (provides insights
into this matter through its discussions on
determining the commencement of a new
month. The process involves the sighting
of the new moon, where two witnesses
present their testimony to the Bet Din in
Yerushalayim. Upon verifying the veracity
of the witnesses’ claims, the Bet Din declares
the start of the new month.
In the discourse surrounding the reliability of
sheds) ראש השנה כד,א) Gemara the ,testimony
light on a specific scenario. It teaches us that
if witnesses happen to witness not the moon
itself but merely its reflection, such as on
water, their testimony is deemed invalid, and
the Bet Din does not endorse it. Drawing a
parallel, the Sefer Halachot Ketanot (פב סימן (
draws an analogy with witnessing the moon’s
reflection in a mirror, asserting that this, too,
would be rejected by the court.
ברכי יוסף חו״מ סימן לה) Chida the ,However
יא אות (presents an alternative perspective.
He contends that a mirror’s reflection might
indeed constitute valid testimony due to its
heightened clarity when compared to the
reflection on water. Consequently, he posits
that this clarity renders the mirror’s testimony
acceptable.
Applying these insights to modern contexts,
certain authorities permit the use of images
from photos or videos as evidence, provided
they exhibit a high degree of clarity. . (עיין
יבי״א ח״ו אבה״ע ס״ג, וכן התיר בשו״ת עין יצחק
(אבה״ע סי‘ לא אות ג
This consideration emerges from the notion
that if a clear and accurate representation is
offered, it aligns with the Torah’s emphasis
on reliable testimony.
Torah’s Uncompromising Standard of
Conviction
In Torah perspectives, the principle of being
“guilty beyond any reasonable doubt” takes a
more stringent form. The Torah’s requirement
for conviction exceeds reasonable doubt—
it demands absolute certainty. The Torah
requires witnesses to see the crime firsthand
and not depend on convincing circumstantial
evidence.
This rigorous approach is supported by
the Torah’s directive in the verse “שמות
ז כג“, which states, (“And the guiltless
and righteous do not slay”). This signifies
that unless a person is directly witnessed
committing the crime, they remain free from
guilt. Another verse, emphasizes (“protect
the assembly”), highlighting the obligation to
shield the accused.
Certainly, we are familiar with the Mishna’s
proclamation that a Sanhedrin, the Jewish
court, which pronounces the death penalty
merely once every 7 years (with some
opinions extending the period to even 70
years), is characterized as a “deadly Bet
(מכות א,י) “.Din
This exacting approach is evident in
various Talmudic and Halachic references,
emphasizing an unshakable commitment to
justice:
Illustrating Torah’s Rigorous Legal
Standards.
An illustrative example is found in a story
recounted by Rabbi Shimon ben Shatach
(ב,לז סנהדרין(. He witnessed an individual
pursuing another with a knife in hand. They
entered an abandoned building, and upon the
rabbi’s entrance, he discovered the pursuer
holding a bloodied knife while the victim
lay fatally wounded. Rabbi Shimon ben
Shatach, however, acknowledged that Torah
law didn’t permit him to convict the pursuer.
Despite witnessing these circumstances,
the rabbi emphasized that he couldn’t be a
witness to the actual stabbing because he
didn’t actually see the crime. Furthermore,
Torah law stipulates the necessity of two
witnesses for a conviction. Although
the rabbi refrained from legal action, he
admonished the pursuer, predicting divine
retribution upon him.
Financial Obligations Hinge on Direct
Witnessing.
This approach isn’t limited to capital
punishment cases; it extends to obligatory
financial responsibilities as well. Only when
witnesses have firsthand knowledge can they
impose a requirement for payment.
The Talmud delves further into legal
principles by recounting a unique incident
involving a camel. This particular camel
exhibited aggressive behavior by attacking
other camels through biting and kicking.
Witnesses were present during an episode
where the unruly camel was on a rampage.
Soon after, the witnesses stumbled upon
another camel, lifeless, in close proximity
to the wild camel. However, crucially, these
witnesses hadn’t directly seen the actual
killing take place.
The Gemara proceeds to relay an interesting
perspective offered by Rav Acha. He asserted
that the owner of the disruptive camel
should indeed be held accountable for the
damages incurred. In his view, the witnessed
aggressive behavior of the camel, coupled
with the subsequent discovery of the dead
camel, was sufficient evidence to obligate the
owner for compensation.
However, when examining this scenario
in accordance with Halacha, the outcome
diverges. It is determined that the owner
of the wild camel is exempt from financial
responsibility. The rationale behind this
ruling lies in the fact that, according to
Halacha, direct witnessing of the actual
killing is a prerequisite for imposing such
liability. Since the witnesses in this case
hadn’t observed the precise moment of the
killing itself, the owner is not held culpable
under Halacha.
This illustration underscores the Torah’s
stringent criteria for conviction, which
necessitates guilt beyond any doubt. The
standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” is not
sufficient according to Torah standards.
Convicting upon robust evidence:
Conversely, there exist cases where
circumstantial evidence is so robust that it
defies any alternative explanation. In such
instances, the Torah permits conviction or
obligation based on this compelling evidence.
(חו״מ סימן צ סעיף טז) Aruch Shulchan The
provides an example that exemplifies this
principle. It discusses the scenario of two
individuals entering an empty house with
no alternative entrance. These individuals
emerge, and one of them bears a wound
that can only be explained by the other
causing it – for instance, a wound between
the shoulders or on the back. The absence of
any other plausible explanation makes this
circumstantial evidence substantial enough
for conviction.
Another case mentioned in the Tur (שם(
involves a person entering a location
containing certain objects, and upon exiting,
the objects are mysteriously absent. Since
no one else was present in the room at that
time, and there is no other access point, the
only reasonable inference is that the person
must have stolen the items. Thus the Halacha
obligates him to either return the items or pay
for them.
These examples accentuate the Torah’s
nuanced approach to evidence, the principle
of “beyond any doubt,” sometimes meet the
circumstantial evidence to be so conclusive
that it leaves no room for doubt. These
scenarios reflect the balanced and just
perspective the Torah brings to legal matters,
ensuring a careful weighing of evidence
while upholding the principles of justice.
Summary:
Summing up these concepts, it’s evident that
convicting someone solely based on photos
or videos, however accurate they may appear,
is no longer viable. The advancements in
today’s AI technology not only fail to meet
the criteria of being “beyond a doubt” but
also fall short of the standard of “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
In light of the complexities brought about
by AI, the straightforward nature of visual
evidence is challenged. While these
technological advances offer incredible
potential, they also introduce new layers
of uncertainty in legal proceedings. This
highlights the importance of a comprehensive
and critical assessment of evidence in a
rapidly evolving technological landscape.
This marks the beginning of a series
addressing the novelty of challenges posed
by artificial intelligence from a Halacha
perspective. In the upcoming installment,
we will delve into the question of whether
a Bet Din can supersede the aforementioned
challenge. Stay tuned for next week’s
exploration.