21 Jun Vehicular Homicide in Jewish Law

Driving a car is operating a dangerous weapon. An accident can cause significant financial damage and physical harm, even death. But who is responsible for the damage?

An article in the journal No’am (no. 10, p. 41, quoted in Yechaveh Da’as, vol. 5 no. 16 n. 2) quotes Rav Shmuel Aharon Yudelowitz as saying that generally a driver is not liable for killing someone in an accident. A car goes forward and the driver merely modulates the gas with his foot on the pedal. If a person enters the car’s path, a driver is obligated to save that potential victim by stopping or moving the car. Even if the driver intentionally lets the car hit the victim, he is only guilty of failing to save the person, not of killing him.

Rav Ovadiah Yosef (Yechaveh Da’as, ibid.) disagrees with this analysis. He compares driving a car to throwing a stone into public property (Makos 8a). If that stone hits and kills someone, you are considered an intentional murderer because you should have been more careful. Ramban (ad loc.) and Tosafos (Bava Kamma 32b sv. meisivei) explain that you are considered a near-intentional murderer (shogeg karov le-meizid) because of the negligence. Similarly, argues Rav Ovadiah, a speeding driver who kills someone in an accident is negligent because he should have been more careful.

However, it seems to me that we can divide drivers who have had accidents into three categories:

Those who drive poorly and disobey traffic laws, for example a speeding driver who hits a pedestrian or another car

Those who drive properly but encounter difficult conditions and make a mistake, for example a driver who panics when his car skids and steers his car into another lane and hits a car

Those who do everything right but get into an accident for other reasons, such as when a pedestrian enters the street without looking to see if a car is coming

It seems that Rav Ovadiah discusses the first and third cases. About the first case, he quotes the early authorities who considered it near-intentional. Others (link 1, link 2) go so far as to consider a reckless driver a pursuer (rodef), at least on some level. Rav Yosef calls the third case entirely unintentional (anus le-gamrei). He does not discuss the second case, in which the driver follows the rules. I suspect he would call it accidental (shogeg).

A kohen who kills someone may not recite Birkas Kohanim (Berakhos 32b). May a kohen who killed someone in a car accident recite these blessings? The Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 128:35) rules like the Rambam that even if he kohen repents, he cannot recite the blessings. The Rema (ad loc.) disagrees and rules like Rashi that a repentant kohen may recite the blessings. Rav Shmuel Wosner (Shevet Ha-Levi 1:43) rules like the Rema, although his case includes other reasons for leniency. Characteristically, Rav Ovadiah follows the Shulchan Arukh.

However, in the third case above of a completely unintentional accident, Rav Ovadiah combines the lenient view of the Rema with the Eliyah Rabbah‘s (128:63) view that even those who are strict should be lenient in an unintentional case (even though the Pri Megadim 128:EE:51 disagrees). With this, Rav Ovadiah allows a repentant kohen who completely unintentionally killed someone in a car accident to recite Birkas Kohanim. Rav Eliezer Melamed (Peninei Halakhah, Likutim, vol. 2 12:5) adds that a third party should confirm that the driver was not at fault.

Rav Ya’akov Ariel (Halakhah Be-Yameinu, p. 330) explains that repentance in this context does not constitute a merely internal process. While it is crucial for a person to regret his misdeeds, including his accidents, a murderer must do more. Rav Wosner (ibid.) accepts fasting and charity as practical repentance. Rav Ariel takes a somewhat different path.

In the past, leading rabbis sometimes advised accidental murderers to leave town, mirroring the biblical exile of an accidental murderer (Num. 35). Rav Ariel first suggests that someone who kills another in a car accident should similarly move his home. He then suggests that a more fitting act of repentance is supporting the family that lost a loved one or, if that is not possible, another orphan or injured child. Support in this context means assisting financially and religiously, helping the children grow into healthy religious Jews.